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ABSTRACT 
IMPROVEMENT OF PERFORMANCE AND CAPACITIES OF WIRELESS AD 
HOC NETWORKS 
Hande BAKİLER 
Başkent University Institute of Science & Engineering 
The Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks are continuously self-organizing wireless networks with 
no fixed infrastructure, where network communication is established without a 
centralized administration. Security is an important issue for mobile ad hoc 
networks, due to the vulnerable nature of these networks. This thesis describes 
the effects of Pulse Jammer attack, Misbehavior Nodes attack and Byzantine 
attacks on the network performance under different traffic loads using Position-
based Routing Protocol such as Geographic Routing Protocol (GRP), Proactive 
Routing Protocol such as Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) Protocol and 
Reactive Routing Protocols such as Ad Hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
Routing Protocol and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) Protocol. The impact of 
security attacks on mobile ad hoc network performance is evaluated by 
investigating which attack is more harmful to the network. Additionally, mentioned 
security routing protocols are surveyed for mobile ad hoc networks and the 
performance of these routing protocols are compared under Pulse Jammer attack, 
under Misbehavior Node attack and under Byzantine attack. Simulation results 
using OPNET simulator show that the efficient utilization of the network reduces 
considerably in the presence of the mentioned attacks. 
KEYWORDS: Ad hoc networks, network security, routing protocols, OPNET 
Advisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Aysel ŞAFAK, Başkent University, Department of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineering 
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ÖZ 
TELSİZ AD HOC AĞLARIN BAŞARIM VE KAPASİTELERİNİN ARTTIRILMASI 
Hande BAKİLER 
Başkent Üniversitesi Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü 
Elektrik-Elektronik Mühendisliği Anabilim Dalı 
Gezgin ad hoc ağlar, ortam koşullarına kendi kendini uyarlayabilen, sabit bir alt 
yapı gerektirmeyen, ağın denetimi, yönetimi için herhangi bir merkezi otoriteye 
gerek duymayarak iletişimi sağlayan dinamik varlıklardır. Güvenlik, gezgin ad hoc 
ağların savunmasız doğası nedeniyle önemli bir konudur. Bu çalışma, Darbe 
Parazit saldırısı, Haşarı Düğüm saldırısı ve Bizans ağ saldırısının farklı trafik 
yüklerine göre ağ performansı üzerindeki etkilerini, Konum tabanlı yol atama 
protokollerinden olan Coğrafi Yönlendirme Protokolü (GRP), Tabloya dayalı yol 
atama protokollerinden olan İyileştirilmiş Bağ Durumu Yönlendirme (OLSR) 
protokolü ve İsteğe bağlı yol atama protokollerinden olan Ad Hoc İsteğe Bağlı 
Uzaklık Vektör (AODV) ve Dinamik Kaynak Yönlendirme (DSR) protokollerini 
kullanarak  açıklamaktadır. Gezgin ad hoc ağlar üzerindeki ağ saldırılarının etkileri 
araştırılarak değerlendirilmektedir. Ayrıca, gezgin ad hoc ağlar için sözedilen 
güvenlik yönlendirme protokolleri de incelenmektedir ve bu protokollerin 
performansları da Darbe Parazit, Haşarı Düğüm ve Bizans ağ saldırıları altında 
karşılaştırılmaktadır. OPNET simülatörü kullanılarak elde edilen simülasyon 
sonuçları, ağın etkin kullanımının söz konusu saldırıların varlığında önemli ölçüde 
azaldığını göstermektedir. 
ANAHTAR SÖZCÜKLER: Ad hoc ağlar, ağ güvenliği, yönlendirme protokolleri, 
OPNET 
Danışman: Yrd.Doç.Dr. Aysel ŞAFAK, Başkent Üniversitesi, Elektrik-Elektronik 
Mühendisliği Bölümü 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Next generation wireless communication systems will require a rapid deployment 
of independent mobile users. An emerging wireless technology, mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs), are efficient, effective, quick, and easy to deploy in networks 
with changing topologies. Each mobile node acts as a host, and also acts as a 
router. Nodes communicate with each other without the intervention of access 
points or base stations [1].  
Ad-hoc networks are suitable for applications where it is not possible to set up a 
fixed infrastructure and have a dynamic topology so that nodes can easily join or 
leave the network at any time. Possible MANET scenarios include 
communications in military and rescue missions in connecting soldiers on the 
battlefield or establishing new networks where a network has collapsed after a 
disaster like an earthquake [2]. Nodes cooperate by forwarding data packets to 
other nodes in the network to find a path to the destination node using routing 
protocols. However, due to security vulnerabilities of the routing protocols, wireless 
ad-hoc networks are unprotected to attacks of the malicious nodes. These nodes 
destroy the network, thereby degrading the network performance. 
Various protocol aware jamming attacks that can be launched in an access point 
based 802.11b network are studied in [3]. It is shown that misbehaving nodes that 
do not adhere to the underlying MAC protocol significantly degrade the network 
throughput. Several hybrid attacks that increase the effectiveness of the attack or 
the decrease the probability of detection of the attack are also presented in the 
paper. 
The effects of Pulse Jammer attack and Misbehavior nodes using Optimized Link 
State Routing Protocol (OLSR), Reactive routing protocol, Ad Hoc On Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) and Geographical are studied in [4], where the impact of 
attack on MANET performance is evaluated in finding out which protocol is more 
vulnerable to these attacks. No single protocol that was studied had an overall 
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better performance under Pulse Jammer attack and Misbehavior nodes security 
threats. 
The performance analysis of misbehavior node attack in WiMAX system are 
investigated in [5]. In the first case study, the results with and without misbehavior 
node attack are compared in WiMAX Network. It is observed that due to 
misbehaving node, the performance of entire network is degraded by increasing 
delay in the network and the unwanted throughput in the network increases. In the 
second case study, an algorithm to detect misbehavior node attack  is proposed 
as they can protect the unwanted communication from misbehavior node attack. 
The problem of selective jamming in wireless networks is addressed in [6]. The 
effectiveness of selective jamming attacks are illustrated by implementing such 
attacks against the TCP protocol. The feasibility of selective jamming attacks are 
illustrated by performing realtime packet classification. 
In this paper, the effects of Pulse Jammer Attack, Misbehavior Node attack and 
Byzantine security attacks on MANET network topology are studied using DSR, 
AODV, OLSR and GRP routing protocols. The purpose of this work is analysing 
the security attacks on MANETs that lead to a reduced network performance, 
reliability and availability. Additionally, several security routing protocols are 
investigated for MANET. For each scenario, normal network traffic is compared to 
the network traffic with five disruptive nodes that are placed in the network 
separately and the results are compared. 
The main contribution of this work is providing insight about network security 
challenges and potential harmful attacks in MANET security under different traffic 
loads using various routing protocols. In this work, performance metrics are 
provided for different network applications in addition to the whole network 
performance using different routing protocols.  
The paper is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, characteristics of ad hoc wireless 
networks, IEEE 802.11 wireless communication standards are described. Quality 
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of Service (QoS) in IEEE 802.11, security in QoS and wireless channel 
characteristics are presented and some related equations are given in this 
chapter. 
In Chapter 3, an overview of the AODV, DSR, OLSR, and GRP routing protocols 
are provided. 
In Chapter 4, security attacks in mobile ad hoc networks, attack characteristics, 
security services, the layer-wise security attacks that are mainly based on physical 
layer, network layer, link layer, transport layer and application layer are presented. 
In Chapter 5, mobile ad hoc wireless network design is introduced by using 
OPNET simulator. Simulation tool, performance metrics and network attacks which 
are used in the simulations are presented and described. In addition, application 
configuration, profile configuration, mobility configuration settings, etc. are 
described. 
Simulation results and analysis are given in Chapter 6, the normal networks are 
compared with the networks which contain jamming nodes, misbehaving nodes 
and  Byzantine nodes in terms of performance metrics, i.e., delay, network load, 
throughput, data dropped, jitter and traffic received by using different routing 
protocols and followed by the conclusion and future work in Chapter 7. 
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2 AD HOC NETWORKS 
A mobile ad hoc network [7-10] is a set of wireless mobile nodes forming a 
dynamic autonomous network and it is also called infrastructure less networking. 
Mobile ad hoc network is the new advancement on field telecommunication 
technology which changes the entire concept of communication. This technology 
is formed as a collaboration of self organized node which formed few hundred to 
thousand of nodes. Nodes communicate with each other without the intervention 
of access points or base stations. This technology is efficient, effective, quick, and 
easy to deploy. Such a network may be connected to the larger internet. Mobile 
nodes that are within each other’s radio range communicate directly via wireless 
links, while those far apart rely on other nodes to relay messages as routers. For 
example, nodes A and C are able to communicate via node B despite being 
separated by more than the transmission range as represented in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Communication in a MANET 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) has no fixed infrastructure and depends on 
nodes to perform routing of data packets. Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET)  
[11; 12] are a form of MANET, wherein, moving vehicles form the nodes of the 
mobile network. VANET uses the participating vehicle as wireless router or node, 
allowing vehicles to connect and create a network with wide range. VANETs differ 
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from typical MANETs, due to their characteristics like high mobility of nodes, 
timevarying density of nodes, frequent disconnections, highly partitioned network 
and dynamically changing topology, which makes them more challenging.  
VANET is an emerging technology, which enables a wide range of applications, 
including road safety, passenger convenience, infotainment and intelligent 
transportation. They help to create safer roads by disseminating information 
regarding the road conditions and traffic scenario among the participating vehicles 
in a timely manner. Figure 2.2  represents an example of vehicular ad hoc network 
architecture. 
In this research, mobile ad hoc networks are used for investigating their behavior 
in respect of security. MANETs are simulated with and without security attacks and 
an analyzing of these attacks and their impact on the routing mechanism are 
examined. 
 
Figure 2.2 Vehicular ad hoc network architecture 
2.1 Characteristics of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
Mobile ad hoc networks eliminate the constraint of infrastructure set up and enable 
devices to create and join networks on the fly, any where, any time and virtually for 
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any application. Some of the characteristics which differentiate ad hoc wireless 
networks from other networks are discussed in below. 
2.1.1 Wireless medium 
In mobile ad hoc networks, nodes communicate wirelessly and share the same 
media. Wireless medium is less reliable than wired media and the channel is 
unprotected from outside signals. 
2.1.2 Dynamic network topology 
In mobile ad hoc networks, nodes can leave or join the network arbitrarily. They 
have temporary network topologies and they dynamically self-organize in arbitrary. 
Therefore, the network topology which is typically multi-hop, can change frequently 
and unpredictably. It causes route changes, frequent network partitions, and 
possibly packet losses. 
2.1.3 Autonomous and infrastructureless 
In mobile ad hoc networks, nodes can directly communicate with all the other 
nodes within their radio ranges. Mobile ad hoc networks does not depend on any 
established infrastructure or centralized administration. People and vehicles can 
be internetworked in areas without a preexisting communication infrastructure. 
Each node acts as an independent router and generates independent data. 
Network management is distributed across different nodes, which brings added 
difficulty in fault detection and management. 
2.1.4 Limited energy resources 
The MANETs consists of different set of devices such as laptops, computers, 
mobile phones etc. All of such devices have different computational power. In 
mobile ad hoc networks, there is a limited time they can operate without changing 
energy resources. Each mobile node which are battery power have limited power 
supply. Processing power is limited and that limits services and applications that 
can be supported.  
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2.2 Standards using in Ad Hoc Networks 
The IEEE802.11 wireless local area network (WLAN) is a shared-medium 
communication network that transmits information over wireless links for all  
IEEE802.11 stations in its transmission range to receive. 
Table 2.1 Comparison of 80.11a/b/g and 802.16 standards 
Feature 
Wi-Fi 
(802.11b) Wi-Fi (802.11a/g) 
WIMAX 
(802.16) 
Primary 
Application Wireless LAN Wireless LAN 
Broadband 
Wireless Access 
Frequency 
Band 2.4 GHz 
2.4GHz, 802.11g 
5GHz, 802.11a 
2 GHz to 11 
GHz NLOS 
10 GHz to 66 
GHz NLOS 
Channel 
Bandwidth 25 MHz 20 Hz 20 MHz 
Max Data Rate 11 Mbit/s 54 Mbit/s 72 Mbit/s 
MIMO streams 1 1 2x2 
Half/Full Duplex Half Half Full 
Radio 
Technology 
Direct 
Sequence 
Spread 
Spectrum 
OFDM 
(64-channels) 
OFDM 
(256-channels) 
Bandwidth 
Efficiency <=0.44 bps/Hz <=2.7 bps/Hz <=5 bps/Hz 
Modulation QPSK BPSK,QPSK, 16QAM, 64QAM 
BPSK, QPSK, 
16QAM,64QAM, 
256QAM 
Forward Error 
Correction None 
Convolutional 
Code 
Convolutional 
Code, Reed- 
Solomon 
Outdoor Range 140 meters 
120 meters for 
802.11a, 140 
meters for 
802.11g 
50 km 
Access 
Protocol CSMA/CA CSMA/CA Request/Grant 
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It is one of the most deployed wireless networks in the world and is highly likely to 
play a major role in multimedia home networks and next-generation wireless 
communications. The main characteristic of the IEEE 802.11 WLAN is its 
simplicity, scalability, and robustness against failures due to its distributed nature. 
IEEE 802.11 wireless networks can be configured into two different modes: ad hoc 
and infrastructure. In ad hoc mode, all wireless stations within the communication 
range can communicate directly with each other, whereas in infrastructure mode, 
an access point (AP) is needed to connect all stations to a distribution system 
(DS), and each station can communicate with others through the AP. Today, IEEE 
802.11 wireless networks are widely installed in homes, corporate buildings, and 
hot spots. As shown in Table 2.1, WLAN and WIMAX are compared with each 
other.  
2.3 Quality of Service (QoS) in IEEE 802.11  
Quality of Services [13-15] is based on the application, a set of service 
performance and the effect of determining the degree of user satisfaction in how to 
provide their service according to European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute. QoS parameters are including bandwidth, delay, jitter (delay variation), 
packet loss for delivery of network services such as voice, video conferencing and 
other application which can control by network administrators to provide users 
consent. 
With the increase in quality of service (QoS) needs in evolving applications, it is 
also desirable to support these services in MANETs. The resource limitations and 
variability further add to the need  for QoS provisioning in such networks. 
However, the characteristics of these networks make QoS support a very complex 
process. 
Many researchers have shown much interest in developing new medium access 
schemes to support QoS. Accordingly, the IEEE 802.11 working group is currently 
working on a new standard called 802.11e to enhance the original 802.11 medium 
access control (MAC) sublayer to support QoS. The original 802.11 WLAN MAC 
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sublayer employs a distributed coordination function (DCF) based on carrier sense 
multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) for medium access, and is 
best known for its asynchronous best effort data transfer. In order to support QoS 
in 802.11 WLAN, the upcoming IEEE802.11e standard adds a new function called 
a hybrid coordination function (HCF) that includes both controlled contention-free 
and contention-based channel access methods in a single channel access 
protocol. The HCF uses a contention-based channel access method called 
enhanced DCF (EDCF) that operates concurrently with a controlled channel 
access mechanism based on a central polling mechanism. HCF supports both 
prioritized and parameterized medium access. 
2.3.1 Quality of service metrics 
QoS is usually defined as a set of service requirements that needs to be met by 
the network while transporting a packet stream from a source to its destination. 
The network is expected to guarantee a set of measurable prespecified service 
attributes to users in terms of end-to-end performance, such as delay, bandwidth, 
probability of packet loss, and delay variance (jitter) [15]. 
2.3.1.1 Delay 
The delay is the average time of the packet passing through the network. It 
includes all over the delay of the network like transmission time delay which 
occurs due to routing broadcastings and buffer queues. It also includes the time of 
generating packet from source to destination and express in seconds. The flow 
delay per hop traffic is defined as in the following Equation 2.1 and 2.2 [16]: 
               (2.1)              
        (2.2) 
where Dk : constant delay at single hop (k) due to processing delay (dproc ), 
propagation delay (d prop ) and transmission delay (dtrans ). 
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Dq(i,k ): represent the queue delay of the (i) packet at (k) hop.   
2.3.1.2 Bandwith 
Bandwidth is concave in the sense that end-to-end bandwidth is the minimum of 
all the links along the path [15]. B in Equation represents the channel bandwidth 
specifically used for transmission of information in an OFDMA system. In OFDM 
systems, each user is allocated all subcarriers and hence resource management 
is limited to which time slots should be allocated to each user. This can be 
determined by the following Equation 2.3. 
   (2.3) 
Where B : effective channel bandwidth (Hz),  
N f : noise Figure (dB),  
N o : thermal noise level (dBm). 
2.3.1.3 Throughput 
Throughput is the ratio of total number of packets received successfully by the 
destination nodes to the number of packets sent by the source nodes. It is an 
important metric as it describes the loss rate. Thus, network throughput in turn 
reflects the maximum throughput that the network can support [17]. The cell 
throughput can be derived as following Equation 2.4 [18]. 
(2.4) 
   
Where U i, j : cell or sector throughput of the sector j of the BS i and in the case of 
omni antenna, 
Nused: number of data subcarriers, 
 Ts: symbol duration, n : number of SSs in the cell, 
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W k : sum of weights of the more efficient transmission path from SS k to the BS: 
min (wr+ws, wb). 
2.3.1.4 Jitter 
Jitter [19] is the ratio of transmission delay of the current packet and the 
transmission delay of the previous packet. Jitter can be calculated only if at least 
two packets have been received. 
2.3.1.5 Packet loss 
Packet loss shows that how many packets are successfully sent and received 
across the whole network. It also explains the number of data dropped during the 
transmission due to interference from other devices. 
Additionaly percentage of packets dropped that passed through malicious nodes 
indicates the percentage of total packets dropped that traverse malicious nodes 
when using each routing protocol, in the presence of different percentages of 
malicious nodes. Assuming that all the packets that pass through a malicious or 
compromised node were altered, this metric can be calculated as Equation 2.5 [7]: 
 
 
(2.5) 
 
 
 
The metric evaluates the degree to which the communication is secure, as packets 
passing through malicious nodes may possibly disrupt secure communication. 
2.3.1.6 SINR 
SINR is Signal to Interference plus Noise ratio can be determined following 
Equation 2.6 [20]: 
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 (2.6) 
 
 
Where t : parent node of the receiver r, 
t ' : different potential concurrent transmitters in the DL 
2.3.2 Security in quality of service 
Security can be considered a QoS attribute. Without adequate security, 
unauthorized access and usage may violate QoS negotiations. The nature of 
broadcasts in wireless networks potentially results in more security exposure. The 
physical medium of communication is inherently insecure, so we need to design 
security-aware routing algorithms for MANETs [15]. 
2.4 Wireless Channel Characteristics 
The characteristics of the wireless communication channel between transmitter 
and receiver controls the performance of the overall system. In this section, the 
mobile radio environment which will be used in this thesis is introduced. 
2.4.1 Attenuation 
Strength of signal falls off with distance over transmission medium. Attenuation is 
greater at higher frequencies. Received signal must be enough to be detected and 
must be sufficiently higher than noise to be received without error.  Attenuation 
can be determined following Equation 2.7: 
Attenuation = Pr / Pt                                                                                                                                           (2.7) 
Where Pt : transmitted signal power, 
 Pr : received signal power, 
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2.4.2 Path loss 
In a wireless environment, communication channel is very diverse between 
transmitter and receiver. Path loss is proportional to the square of the distance 
between the transmitter and receiver. Free-space path loss is the loss in signal 
strength of an electromagnetic wave. 
Free space path loss is calculated for gain of antennas using Equation 2.8: 
  
(2.8) 
Where Pt : transmitted signal power, 
Pr : received signal power, 
λ = carrier wavelength, 
d : propagation distance, 
c : speed of light (≈ 3 x 108 m/s), 
where d and λ are in the same units (e.g., meters)  
Free space loss is calculated for gain of antennas using Equation 2.9: 
   
(2.9) 
Where Gt : transmitted gain, 
Gr : received gain, 
At : transmitted effective area, 
Ar : received effective area. 
2.4.3 Signal to noise ratio 
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) is the difference between the received power and the 
channel noise. 
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Ratio of signal energy per bit to noise power density per Hertz is calculated using 
Equation 2.10: 
 (2.10) 
Where Eb :  signal energy associated with each user data bit, 
N0 : noise spectral density, 
S: signal power, 
R: user bit rate, 
k:  Boltzmann’s constant 
TR : receiver noise temperature in degrees Kelvin. 
Boltzmann’s constant equala 1.38E-23 Joules/0K. 
2.4.4 Multipath propagation 
Multipath describes the multiple paths a radio wave may follow between 
transmitter and receiver. Multipath obstacles reflect signals so that multiple copies 
with varying delays are received. 
Fading, shadowing, reflection, and scattering are mechanisms in multipath 
propagation. Figure 2.3 shows an examole of multipath effects in wireless 
communication. 
 
Figure 2.3 Illustration of multipath effects in wireless communication 
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Reflection occurs when signal encounters a surface that is large relative to the 
wavelength of the signal. Diffraction occurs at the edge of an impenetrable body 
that is large compared to wavelength of radio wave. Scattering  occurs when 
incoming signal hits an object whose size is in the order of the wavelength of the 
signal or less. 
Propagation losses are also an issue in wireless channels. These are of two basic 
types: diffusive losses and shadow fading. Diffusive losses arise because of the 
open nature of wireless channels. For example, the energy radiated by a simple 
point source in free space will spread over an ever-expanding spherical surface as 
the energy propagates away from the source. Shadow fading is typically modeled 
by attenuation (i.e., a multiplicative factor) in signal amplitude that follows a log-
normal distribution. The variation in this fading is specified by the standard 
deviation of the logarithm of this attenuation [21]. 
There are two types of fading effects called as large-scale fading and small-scale 
fading that characterize mobile communications (Rappaport 1996). Large-scale 
fading represents the average signal power attenuation or path-loss due to the 
motion over large areas. In this type of fading the receiver is shadowed by 
obstacles between the tranmitterreceiver pair. Small-scale fading is used to 
describe the rapid fluctuations of the amplitude of a radio signal over a short 
period of time or travel distance [22]. 
Multi-path propagation is calculated using Equation 2.11 : 
 
(2.11) 
 
 
Where η : reflection coefficent of the road, 
λ : wavelength, h: antenna height, γ : path-loss coefficient, 
d : distance between transmitter and receiver. 
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3 ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
The routing protocols of MANETs are classified into two main categories, 
topology-based and position-based. Topology-based routing protocols [23] use the 
information about the links that exist in the network to perform packet forwarding. 
They can be further divided into proactive, reactive, and hybrid approaches.  
A proactive routing protocol [24; 25] is also called "table driven" routing protocol. 
Using a proactive routing protocol, nodes in a mobile ad hoc network continuously 
evaluate routes to all reachable nodes and attempt to maintain consistent, up-to-
date routing information. Therefore, a source node can get a routing path 
immediately if it needs one. Table-driven routing protocols attempt to maintain 
consistent, up-to-date routing information from each node to every other node in 
the network. These protocols require each node to maintain one or more tables to 
store routing information, and they respond to changes in network topology by 
propagating updates throughout the network in order to maintain a consistent 
network view. Example of Proactive Routing Protocol is Optimized Link State 
Routing Protocol (OLSR). 
A reactive routing protocol [1; 26] is often known as on- demand routing or source-
initiated routing protocol. In a reactive routing protocol, a route discovery operation 
invokes a route-determination procedure. The discovery procedure terminates 
either when a route has been found or no route available after examination for all 
route permutations. On-Demand Routing Protocols are not maintained 
periodically. Here route tables are created when required. When the source node 
wants to connect to the destination node, it broad casts the route request (RREQ) 
packet to its neighbours. Just as neighbours of the source node receive the 
broadcasted request packet, they forward the packet to their neighbours and this 
action is happen until the destination is found. Afterward, the destination node 
sends acknowledgement to source node in the shortest path. The route remains in 
the route tables of the nodes through shortest path until the route is no longer 
needed. Examples of Reactive Routing Protocols are the Dynamic Source Routing 
(DSR), Ad Hoc on Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV). 
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Hybrid ad hoc routing protocols [1; 19] combine local proactive routing and global 
reactive routing  and overcome their shortcomings in order to achieve a higher 
level of efficiency and scalability. Normally, hybrid routing protocols for mobile ad 
hoc networks exploit hierarchical network architectures. Proper proactive routing 
approach and reactive routing approach are exploited in different hierarchical 
levels, respectively. Hybrid ad hoc routing protocol is initially established with 
some proactively prospected routes and then serves the demand from additionally 
activated nodes through reactive flooding. Some of the existing hybrid protocols 
are Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [27; 28] and Temporally Ordered Routing 
Algorithm (TORA) [25; 27]. Figure 3.1 shows the prominent way of classifying 
MANET routing protocols. 
 
Figure 3.1 Classification of MANET routing protocols 
In position based routing protocols [23; 24], the routing decisions are made on the 
basis of the current position of the source and the destination nodes, instead of 
using routing tables and network addresses and each node determines its own 
position through the use of GPS or some other type of positioning service [29; 30]. 
A location service is used by the sender of a packet to determine the position of 
the destination and to include it in the packet’s destination address. The routing 
decision at each node is then based on the destination’s position contained in the 
packet and the position of the forwarding node’s neighbors. Position-based routing 
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thus does not require the establishment or maintenance of routes. The nodes have 
neither to store routing tables nor to transmit messages to keep routing tables up 
to date. As a further advantage, position-based routing supports the delivery of 
packets to all nodes in a given geographic region in a natural way. Table 3.1 
represents the comparison of routing protocols in MANETs. 
Table 3.1 Comparison of routing protocols in MANETs 
Characteristics DSR AODV OLSR GRP TORA 
Routing 
Philosophy 
Reactive Reactive Proactive 
Position-
based 
Hybrid 
Type of 
Routing 
Source 
Routing 
Hop by 
hop 
routing 
Hop by 
hop routing 
Hop by 
hop 
routing 
Hop by hop 
routing 
Frequency of 
Updates 
As 
needed 
As 
needed 
Periodically 
Based on 
mode of 
operation 
Periodically 
Multiple routes Yes No No No No 
3.1 The Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) Protocol 
DSR [1; 25; 31; 32] is a reactive unicast routing protocol that utilizes source 
routing algorithm. It is similar to AODV in that it establishes a route on-demand 
when a transmitting mobile node requests one. However, it uses source routing 
instead of relying on the routing table at each intermediate device. In source 
routing algorithm, each data packet contains complete routing information to reach 
its dissemination. Additionally, in DSR each node uses caching technology to 
maintain route information that it has learnt.  
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The sender knows the complete hop-by-hop route to the destination, where the 
routes are stored in a route cache. This protocol is particularly designed for use in 
multi hop wireless ad hoc networks of mobile nodes. Basically, DSR protocol does 
not need any existing network infrastructure or administration and this allows the 
network to be completely self-organizing and self-configuring. 
When a node in a mobile ad hoc network attempts to send a data packet to a 
destination for which it does not know the route, it uses a route discovery process 
to dynamically determine one. Route discovery works by flooding the network with 
route request (RREQ) packets. This route request contains the address of the 
destination, along with the source node’s address and a unique identification 
number. The sender will be waiting till the route is discovered. During waiting time, 
the sender can perform other tasks such as sending/forwarding other packets. As 
the route request packet arrives to any of the nodes, each node receiving the 
packet checks whether it knows of a route to the destination. If it does not, it adds 
its own address to the route record of the packet and then forwards the packet 
along its outgoing links. To limit the number of route requests propagated on the 
outgoing links of a node, a mobile only forwards the route request if the request 
has not yet been seen by the mobile and if the mobile’s address does not already 
appear in the route record.  
 
Figure 3.2 Source node’s broadcast 
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A route reply is generated when the route request reaches either the destination 
itself, or an intermediate node which contains in its route cache an unexpired route 
to the destination. RREQ and RREP packets are also source routed. The RREQ 
builds up the path traversed across the network. The RREP routes itself back to 
the source by traversing this path backward. The route carried back by the RREP 
packet is cached at the source for future use. By the time the packet reaches the 
destination or an intermediate node, it contains a route record yielding the 
sequence of hops taken.  
In DSR, when the data link layer detects a link disconnection, a ROUTE_ERROR 
packet is sent backward to the source. After receiving the ROUTE_ERROR 
packet, the source node initiates another route discovery operation. Additionally, 
all routes containing the broken link should be removed from  the route caches of 
the immediate nodes when the ROUTE_ERROR packet is transmitted to the 
source. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 represents the propagation of request (PREQ) 
packet and the route reply with route record in DSR, respectively. 
 
Figure 3.3 Destination node’s reply 
3.2 The Ad Hoc on Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing Protocol 
AODV routing protocol [1; 25; 31; 33] is a reactive unicast routing protocol for 
mobile ad hoc networks which only needs to maintain the routing information 
21 
 
about the active paths. In AODV, routing information is maintained in routing 
tables at nodes. Every mobile node keeps a next-hop routing table, which contains 
the destinations to which it currently has a route to. A routing table entry expires if 
it has not been used or reactivated for a pre-specified expiration time.  
In AODV, when a source node wants to send a data packet to a destination node 
and does not have a route to the destination node, it initiates route discovery by 
broadcasting a route request (RREQ) to its neighbors. A RREQ includes 
addresses of the source and the destination, the broadcast ID, which is used as its 
identifier, the last seen sequence number of the destination as well as the source 
node’s sequence number. Sequence numbers are important to ensure loop-free 
and up-to-date routes. The immediate neighbors who receive this RREQ 
rebroadcast the same RREQ to their neighbors. This process is repeated until the 
RREQ reaches the destination node.  
Upon receiving the first arrived RREQ, the destination node sends a route reply 
(RREP) to the source node through the reverse path where the RREQ arrived. 
The same RREQ that arrives later will be ignored by the destination node. To 
reduce the flooding overhead, a node discards RREQs that it has seen before and 
the expanding ring search algorithm is used in route discovery operation. In 
addition, AODV enables intermediate nodes that have sufficiently fresh routes 
(with destination sequence number equal or greater than the one in the RREQ) to 
generate and send an RREP to the source node.  
AODV uses only symmetric links and a RREP follows the reverse path of the 
respective RREP. Upon receiving the RREP packet, each intermediate node along 
the route updates its next-hop table entries with respect to the destination node. 
The redundant RREP packets or RREP packets with lower destination sequence 
number will be dropped. Figure 3.4 represents an example of RREQ messages in 
action where node A wants to send data packets to node G, Figure 3.5 shows  an 
example of RREP messages in respect of AODV routing protocol, and Figure 3.6 
represents an example of RERR messages in respect of AODV routing protocol.  
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Figure 3.4 Example of AODV RREQ messages 
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Figure 3.5 Example of AODV RREP messages 
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Figure 3.6 Example of AODV RERR message 
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An important feature of AODV is the maintenance of timer-based states in each 
node, regarding utilization of individual routing table entries. A routing table entry is 
expired if not used recently. A node uses hello messages to notify its existence to 
its neighbors. Therefore, the link status to the next hop in an active route can be 
monitored. A set of predecessor nodes is maintained for each routing table entry, 
indicating the set of neighboring nodes which use that entry to route data packets. 
When a node discovers a link disconnection, it broadcasts a route error (RERR) 
packet to its neighbors, which in turn propagates the RERR packet towards nodes 
whose routes may be affected by the disconnected link. Then, the affected source 
can re-initiate a route discovery operation if the route is still needed. In contrast to 
DSR, RERR packets in AODV are intended to inform all sources using a link when 
a failure occurs. 
3.2.1 The differences between DSR and AODV 
DSR has access to a significantly greater amount of routing information than 
AODV. For example, in DSR, using a single request-reply cycle, the source can 
learn routes to each intermediate node on the route in addition to the intended 
destination. Each intermediate node can also learn routes to every other node on 
the route. Promiscuous listening of data packet transmissions can also give DSR 
access to a significant amount of routing information. In particular, it can learn 
routes to every node on the source route of that data packet. In the absence of 
source routing and promiscuous listening, AODV can gather only a very limited 
amount of routing information. In particular, route learning is limited only to the 
source of any routing packets being forwarded. This usually causes AODV to rely 
on a route discovery flood more often, which may carry significant network 
overhead. The current specification of DSR does not contain any explicit 
mechanism to expire stale routes in the cache, or prefer “fresher” routes when 
faced with multiple choices. 
In contrast, AODV has a much more conservative approach than DSR. When 
faced with two choices for routes, the fresher route (based on destination 
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sequence numbers) is always chosen. Also, if a routing table entry is not used 
recently, the entry is expired. 
The route deletion activity using RERR is also conservative in AODV. By way of a 
predecessor list, the error packets reach all nodes using a failed link on its route to 
any destination. In DSR, however, a route error simply backtracks the data packet 
that meets a failed link. Nodes that are not on the upstream route of this data 
packet but use the failed link are not notified promptly [31]. 
In AODV, there is no need for system-wide broadcasts due to local changes, in 
contrast to DSR. AODV has multicasting and uncasting routing protocol property 
within a uniform framework. Source node, destination node and next hops are 
addressed using IP addressing. AODV builds routes using a route request / route 
reply cycle.  
3.3 Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) Protocol 
OLSR Protocol, as defined in [7; 19; 25; 34], is a proactive routing protocol where 
the routes are always immediately available when needed. It is often called table-
driven protocol as it maintains and updates its routing table frequently.  
In OLSR, each node intermittently broadcasts its routing table, allowing each node 
to build an inclusive view of the network topology. The nature of this protocol 
creates a large amount of overhead and in order to reduce overhead, it limits the 
number of mobile nodes that can forward network wide traffic and for this purpose 
it use Multi Point Relays (MPRs), which are responsible for forwarding routing 
messages and optimization for flooding operation. In OLSR, each node selects its 
own MPR from its neighbors, such that, it may reach each two hop neighbor via at 
least one MPR, then it can forward packets, if control traffic received from a 
previous hop has selected the current node as a MPR. Each MPR node maintains 
the list of nodes that were selected as an MPR; this list is called an MPR selector 
list. Only nodes selected as MPR nodes are responsible for advertising, as well as 
forwarding an MPR selector list advertised by other MPRs.  
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Figure 3.7 Flooding packets using MPR 
Generally, OLSR has also three types of control messages such that HELLO 
message, Topology Control (TC) message and Multiple Interface Declaration 
(MID) mesage. The Hello message is transmitted for sensing the neighbor and for 
Multi-Point Distribution Relays (MPR) calculation. Topology control is link state 
signaling that is performed by OLSR. MPRs are used to optimize the messaging 
process. MID messages contains the list of all IP addresses used by any node in 
the network. 
In OLSR, each node generates a HELLO message periodically. A node’s HELLO 
message contains its own address and the list of its one-hop neighbors. By 
exchanging HELLO messages, each node can learn a complete topology up to 
two hops. HELLO messages are exchanged locally by neighbor nodes and are not 
forwarded further to other nodes. Nodes maintain information of neighbors and 
MPRs by sending and receiving HELLO messages from its neighbors.  
A TC message is the message that is used for route calculation. Mobility causes, 
route change and topology changes very frequently and TC messages are 
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broadcasted throughout the network. In OLSR, each MPR node advertises TC 
messages periodically. A TC message contains the list of the sender’s MPR 
selector. In OLSR, only MPR nodes are responsible for forwarding TC messages. 
Upon receiving TC messages from all of the MPR nodes, all mobile nodes 
maintain the routing table that contains routes to all reachable destination nodes. 
Figure 3.7 represents the flooding packets in OLSR. 
Associated with each neighbour is an attribute including the directionality of the 
link to that neighbour. The node is labeled symmetric if the link to the neighbour is 
bidirectional, or asymmetric if a Hello has been received from that node but the 
link has not been confirmed as bidirectional. When a node receives this Hello 
message from each of its neighbours, it obtains complete knowledge of its two-hop 
neighbour set at that point in time. Further, if its own address is listed in the Hello 
message, it knows the link with that neighbour is bidirectional. It can then update 
the status of that neighbour to be symmetric. Figure 3.8 represents the symmetric 
link formation for OLSR protocol. 
 
Figure 3.8 OLSR symmetric link formation (Hello Message Exchange) 
3.4 Geographic Routing Protocol (GRP) 
GRP [11; 24; 35] also known as position-based routing, is a well researched 
approach for ad hoc routing where nodes are aware of their own geographic 
locations and also of its immediate neighbors and source node are aware of the 
destination’s position. The data packets are routed through the network using the 
geographic location of the destination and not the network address. GRP operates 
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without routing tables and routing to destination depends upon the information 
each node has about its neighbors.  
Geographic routing is simple and efficient. Under the assumption of bidirectional 
connectivity, geographic routing can be efficiently implemented on a planar sub-
graph of the one-hop connectivity graph.  
The most commonly used geographic routing algorithms are greedy routing and 
face routing. In greedy forwarding, the data packet is brought closer to the 
destination in each step by the nodes forwarding it to the most suitable neighbor. 
The suitable neighbor is the one which reduces the distance to the destination in 
each step. In face routing, the regions are considered to be separated by the 
edges of a planar graph. The algorithm takes a way around the face; it returns to 
the point closest to the destination and explores the next face closer to the 
destination.  
 
Figure 3.9 Greedy forwarding example. y is x’s closest neighbor to D. 
In Figure 3.9, x receives a packet for destination D. Radio range of x is denoted by 
the dotted circle about x, and the arc with radius equal to the distance between y 
and D is shown as the dashed arc about D. x forwards the packet to y, as the 
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distance between y and D is less than that between D and any of x’s other 
neighbors. This greedy forwarding process repeats until the packet reaches D [36]. 
Face routing always finds a path to the destination. Greedy forwarding fails if there 
is no next hop among the neighbors which is closer to the destination. When no 
neighbor provides progress towards the destination, perimeter routing must be 
used where the next-hop is selected to traverse the perimeter of the region where 
greedy forwarding fails. Traditional perimeter routing requires the sender to know 
all its neighbors so that it can construct a planar subgraph. Perimeter mode 
forwarding continues as long as there is no better greedy next hop neighbor. The 
state required at each node depends only on the node density. Figure 3.10 
represents an example of position-based routing protocol. 
In position-based routing, route breakups will frequently occur. It is induced by 
nodal mobility or nodal and link failures as well as by fluctuations in the 
communications transport quality experienced across the networks 
communications links. In addition to that, it is caused by signal interferences, 
fading and multi-path phenomena, producing environmental noise and signal 
interference processes. On the other hand, route breakups lead the frequent 
operation of rebuilding routes that consume lots of the network resources and the 
energy of the nodes. 
 
Figure 3.10 Example of position-based routing protocol 
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4 SECURITY ATTACKS IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS 
Ad hoc networks are more vulnerable than the traditional wired networks. Security 
is much more difficult to maintain and malicious attackers can easily disrupt 
network operations by violating protocol specifications in ad hoc networks. In the 
following subsections, possible attacks on routing protocols and layer-wise 
security attacks against ad hoc networks are discussed in detail. 
4.1 Attack Characteristics 
Open medium, lack of central monitoring, dynamic topology, no clear defense 
mechanism, distributed operation and resource constraints are some of the unique 
characteristics that exist in the ad hoc networks. They increase the vulnerability of 
such networks. Examples include looking at the behaviour of network attacks, i.e.,  
passive and active which are represented in Figure 4.1, the source of the attacks, 
i.e., external and internal, the processing capability of the attackers, i.e., mobile 
and wired and the number of the attackers, i.e., single and multiple. 
 
Figure 4.1 Classifications of passive and active attacks 
32 
 
4.1.1 Active and passive attacks 
In active attack [8; 37], the attacker disrupts the performance of the network, steal 
important information and try to destroy the data during the exchange in the 
network. Active attacks can be an internal or an external attack. The active attacks 
destroy the performance of the network, in such case they act as an internal node 
in the network and it is easy for the attacker to exploit any internal node. Active 
attacks actively alter the data with the intention to obstruct the operation of the 
targeted networks. Examples of active attacks comprise actions such as message 
modifications, message replays, message fabrications and the denial of service 
attacks. 
Passive attacks [8; 37] do not disrupt the normal operations of the network. Before 
the attacker launch an attack against the network, the attacker has enough 
information about the network that it can easily hijack and inject attack in the 
network. Examples of passive attacks in mobile ad hoc networks are 
eavesdropping attacks and traffic analysis attacks. Figure 4.2 represents the 
active and passive attacks for ad hoc networks. 
 
Figure 4.2 Active and passive attacks in MANETs 
4.1.2 External and internal attacks 
External attacks [8; 37] are typically active attacks that are targeted e.g. to cause 
congestion, propagate incorrect routing information, prevent services from working 
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properly or shut down them completely. External attacks can typically be 
prevented by using standard security mechanisms such as firewalls where the 
access of unauthorized person to the network can be mitigated, encryption and so 
on.  
Internal attacks [8; 37] are typically more severe attacks, since the adversaries are 
already part of the mobile ad hoc network as authorized nodes. Internal attacks 
are much more severe attacks then external attacks and difficult to detect when 
compared to external attacks. Internal nodes are identified as compromised nodes 
if the external attackers hijacked the authorized internal nodes and are then using 
them to launch attacks against the mobile ad hoc networks. Security requirements 
such as authentication, confidentiality and integrity are severely vulnerable in the 
mobile ad hoc networks with the compromised internal nodes. Figure 4.3 shows 
the external and internal attacks in the ad hoc wireless networks. 
 
Figure 4.3 External and internal attacks in ad hoc networks 
4.1.3 Mobile and wired attacks 
Mobile attackers have the same capabilities as the other nodes in the ad hoc 
networks. Since they have the same resources limitations, their capabilities to 
harm the networks operations are also limited. They are not capable to launch the 
network jamming attacks to disrupt the whole networks operations. 
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Wired attackers are capable of gaining access to the external resources such as 
the electricity. Existence of the wired attackers in the mobile ad hoc networks is 
always possible. Since they have more resources, they could launch more severe 
attacks in the networks, such as jamming the whole networks or breaking 
expensive cryptography algorithms [8]. 
4.1.4 Single and multiple attackers 
Attackers might choose to launch attacks against the ad hoc networks 
independently or by colluding with the other attackers. One man action or single 
attackers usually generate a moderate traffic load as long as they are not capable 
to reach any wired facilities. Since they also have similar abilities to the other 
nodes in the networks, their limited resources become the weak points to them.  
However, if several attackers are colluding to launch attacks, defending the ad hoc 
networks against them will be much harder. Colluding attackers could easily shut 
down any single node in the network and be capable to degrading the 
effectiveness of network’s distributed operations including the security 
mechanisms [8; 38]. 
4.2 Security Attack Types In Ad Hoc Networks 
The fundamental characteristics of ad hoc networks make them susceptible to 
many network attacks. There are many types of attacks in different layers. The 
intruder nodes attack ad hoc networks using different ways. The layer-wise 
security attacks are mainly based on physical layer, network layer, link layer, 
transport layer and application layer. 
4.2.1 Physical layer attacks 
The physical layer [8; 39; 40] transmits the data packets through physical medium. 
The signal of radio waves are highly vulnerable on physical layer in ad hoc 
networks. The common radio wireless communication is easy to jam, because of 
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its nature of using open medium. Any attacker can overhear and disrupt the 
transmission of wireless network physically.  
Physical layer security is important for ad hoc network security, because many 
attacks can take place in this layer.  An attacker with sufficient transmission power 
and knowledge of the physical and medium access control layer mechanisms can 
gain access to the wireless medium. Such attacks could be made less useful by 
encrypting the communication signal, employing spread-spectrum communication 
technology, and using a tamper-resistant hardware. These attacks are simple to 
execute as compared to the other attacks. They do not require the complete 
knowledge of the technology. Some of the attacks identified at physical layer 
include eavesdropping, interference, and jamming etc.  
4.2.1.1 Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping [38; 39; 40] can be defined as interception and reading of 
messages and conversations by unintended receivers. It includes the tracking and 
taping the information traversing on the network. The nodes in ad hoc networks 
share a wireless medium and the wireless communication use the RF spectrum 
and transmission by nature which can be easily captured with receivers tuned to 
the proper frequency. The main aim of such attacks is to obtain the confidential 
information that should be kept secret during the communication. As a result 
conveyed message can be eavesdropped as well as fake message can be 
injected into the network.  
 
Figure 4.4 An attack on communication between source and destination 
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4.2.1.2 Jamming 
Jamming [4; 39] is a special class of DoS attacks which are initiated by malicious 
node after determining the frequency of communication. Jammer attack is 
commonly used to wipe out the transmission on the target wireless networks. In 
this type of attack, the jammer transmits signals along with security threats. 
Jammer attack prevents sending and receiving data packets on ad hoc networks 
and causes message to be lost or corrupt.   
4.2.1.3 Interference 
In interference of radio signals [38; 39; 41], a powerful transmitter can generate 
signal that will be strong enough to overwhelm the target signal and can disrupt 
communications. The effects of such attacks depend on the routing protocol in 
use. Attacker can change the order of messages or attempt to replay old 
messages. Old messages may be replayed to reintroduce out of date information. 
Interference can happen with radio waves of MANETs, because WLAN use 
abandoned radio frequencies. Other electromagnetic devices operating in the 
infrared can overlap over the traffic.  
4.2.2 Data link layer attacks 
Data link layer is commonly known as link layer. It ensures the reliable 
communication link between neighbour nodes. Data link layer defines different 
networks and protocol characteristics. Many attacks can be launched in link layer 
by disrupting the cooperation of the protocols of this layer. In data link layer, 
adversaries might jam the communication links by sending huge data to the 
networks, or by replaying unnecessary packets to exhaust the networks’ 
resources. Expensive cryptography algorithms and more sophisticated security 
measures could be very useful at this layer to protect the networks and to 
distinguish between valid and invalid packets traversed in the networks [8]. 
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4.2.2.1 Traffic analysis 
The attacks of traffic analysis [38; 39] identifies the characteristics of 
communication on radio wireless transmission. Data on who is connecting with 
whom, how often, how much, and when is simply available to any listener within 
range of the wireless network. Traffic analysis can also be conducted as active 
attack by destroying nodes, which stimulates self organization in the network, and 
valuable data about the topology can be gathered. These attacks are not 
considerable for ad hoc networks but they are fall into other WLAN attacks. 
4.2.2.2 Attacks in IEEE 802.11 MAC  
Many attacks can be thrown in link layer by unsettling the teamwork of the 
protocols of this layer. MAC protocols have to coordinate the transmission of the 
nodes on the shared communication or transmission medium. The IEEE 802.11 
MAC is susceptible for DoS attacks. To launch the DoS attack, the attacker may 
exploit the binary exponential backoff scheme. For example, the attacker may 
corrupt frames easily by adding some bits or ignoring the ongoing transmission. 
Among the contending nodes, the binary exponential scheme favors the last 
winner which leads to capture effect. Capture effect means that nodes which are 
heavily loaded tend to capture the channel by sending data continuously, thereby 
resulting lightly loaded neighbors to backoff endlessly. Malicious nodes may take 
the advantage of this capture effect vulnerability. Moreover, it can cause a chain 
reaction in the upper level protocols using backoff scheme, like TCP window 
management [41]. 
4.2.2.3 IEEE 802.11 WEP weakness 
The Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) [38; 40] was designed for pointing at giving 
some layer of security to wireless networks. It is well known that WEP is 
vulnerable to message privacy and message integrity attacks and probabilistic 
cipher key recovery attacks. Various security standards such as IEEE 802.11i, 
WPA, and IEEE 802.1 X were recommended to enhance the security issues in 
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802.11. In spite of their efficiency, these standards do not provide any strength to 
the security approach for monitoring of the verification in a disseminated 
architecture. 
4.2.3 Network layer attacks 
In network layer [4; 39], the attackers disturbs the network traffic by attacking on 
network layer, inject themselves in the path between source and destination, and 
get control of the network traffic flow. When the network is hijack, the attackers 
can create routing loops to form severe congestion.  
As shown in Figure 4.5, the malicious node “X” can absorb important data by 
placing itself between source “A” and destination “D”. “X” can also divert the data 
packets exchanged between “A” and “D”, which results in significant end to end 
delay between “A” and “D”. This example shows that there is no route security 
between nodes, therefore any intruder node disturb the traffic on an ad hoc 
network. 
 
Figure 4.5 Routing attack by malicious node 
4.2.3.1 Black hole attack 
In black hole attack [38; 39], a malicious nodes trick all their adjoining nodes to 
attract all the routing packets to them. It exploits the routing protocol to promote 
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itself as having a good and valid path to a endpoint node. It tries to become an 
element of an active route. On receiving the request the malicious node sends a 
fake reply with extremely short route. In Figure 4.6, malicious node “4” advertises 
itself in such a way that it has a shortest route to the destination. When source 
node “S” wants to send data to destination node “D”, it initiates the route discovery 
process. The malicious node “4” when receives the route request, it immediately 
sends response to source. If reply from node “4” reaches first to the source than 
the source node “S” ignores all other reply messages and begin to send packet via 
route node “2”. As a result, all data packets are consumed or lost at malicious 
node. 
 
Figure 4.6 Blackhole attack 
4.2.3.2 Wormhole attack 
Wormhole attack [39; 41] takes place when two geographically separated 
adversaries create a tunnel called wormhole tunnel and uses encapsulation and 
decapsulation to make a false route between two malicious nodes. The tunnel is 
created either using a wired link or by having a long range high bandwidth wireless 
link operating at a different frequency band.  
Wormhole attack is similar to black hole attack. Both attacks share the similar 
phenomena, but wormhole atttacks work with a collision with other nodes.  
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The goal of wormhole attack is to affect the routing protocols of ad hoc networks 
such as AODV and DSR protocols. In this attack, a pair of conniving attackers 
record packets at one location and replay them at another location using a private 
network.  
Figure 4.7 represents the wormhole attack. It is also possible for the attacker to 
forward each bit by the wormhole directly, without waiting for a whole packet to be 
received before start to tunnel the bits of the packet, in order to lessen delay 
introduced by the wormhole. 
 
Figure 4.7 Wormhole attack 
4.2.3.3 Byzantine attack  
In Byzantine attacks [42; 43], a compromised intermediate node or a set of 
compromised intermediate nodes collectively carries out attacks such as creating 
routing loops, routing packets on non-optimal paths and selectively dropping 
packets. Byzantine attack drops, modifies and misroutes the forwarding packets in 
an attempt to disrupt the routing service. This kind of failures is not easy for 
identification, since the network seems to be operating very normally in the view of 
the user. 
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4.2.3.4 Rushing attack 
In rushing attack [4; 26], the authorized node in on-demand routing protocol 
require a RREQ packet to find a path to destination. When a malicious node 
receives a RREQ packet from a source node, it rapidly broadcast it throughout the 
network topology before the other nodes on the network topology receives RREQ 
packets. When nodes on the network receive this original packet, data packets will 
be duplicate. Because, they already have received that data packet form the 
malicious node. Therefore, the original packet is discarded. On-demand routing 
protocols such as AODV and DSR routing protocols are more vulnerable to this 
attack, because whenever source node floods the route request packet in the 
network, an adversary node receives the route request packet and sends without 
any hop count update and delay into the network. 
4.2.3.5 Flooding attack 
In flooding attack [26; 38], attacker consumes the network resources such as 
bandwidth and consumes a node resources such as battery power. In RREQ 
flooding attack, the attacker broadcasts many RREQ packets time-to-time to the IP 
address which does not exist in the network. On demand routing protocols uses 
the route discovery process to obtain the route between the two nodes. In route 
discovery, the source node broadcast the RREQ packets in the network. Since the 
priority of the RREQ control packet is higher than the packet, RREQ packets are 
transmitted.  
4.2.3.6 Resource consumption attack 
Resource consumption attack [9; 44] is also known as the sleep deprivation attack. 
In MANETs, the battery-powered devices try to save energy by transmitting only 
when absolutely needed. The target of resource consumption attack is to send 
request of excessive route detection or needless packets to the victim node in 
order to consume the battery life. An attacker thus can upset the normal 
functionalities of the MANET.  
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4.2.3.7 Location disclosure attack 
Location dislosure attack [39; 40] is a part of the information expose attack. The 
malicious node leaks information regarding the location or the structure of the 
network and uses the information for further attack. It gathers the node location 
information such as a route map and knows which nodes are situated on the target 
route. 
4.2.4 Transport layer attacks 
In transport layer, messages are exchanged on the end-to-end basis using 
secured routes established in the network layer. The security issues related to 
transport layer are authentication, securing end-to-end communications through 
data encryption, handling delays, packet loss and so on. The nodes in a MANET 
are vulnerable to the SYN flooding and session hijacking attacks [8; 40]. 
4.2.4.1 Session hijacking 
In session hijacking [4; 38; 39; 40] an intruder node behaves as an authentic 
system. In this attack, the attacker spoofs the victim node’s IP address, finds the 
correct sequence number, i.e., expected by the target and then launches various 
DoS attacks. The malicious node tries to collect secure data such as passwords, 
secret keys, logon names and other information from nodes. Figure 4.8 represents 
an example of session hijacking. 
 
Figure 4.8 Session hijacking 
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4.2.4.2 SYN flooding 
The SYN flooding attack is also Denial of Service (DoS) attack which is completed 
by generating a large number of half-opened TCP connections with a victim node. 
Due to nature of this attack malicious node never open the full connection to 
handshake. Figure 4.9 represents an example of SYN flooding attack. 
 
Figure 4.9 SYN flooding attack 
4.2.5 Application layer attacks 
Applications need to be designed to handle frequent disconnection and 
reconnection with peer applications as well as widely varying delay and packet 
loss characteristics. Application layer protocols are vulnerable to many DoS 
attacks. The application layer contains user data. It supports protocols such as 
HTTP, SMTP, TELNET and FTP, which provides many vulnerabilities and access 
points for attackers. The main attacks in application layer are repudiation attacks 
and malicious code attacks [39; 40]. 
4.2.5.1 Repudiation attacks  
In Repudiation attacks [40] the solution that taken to solve authentication or non-
repudiation attacks in network layer or in transport layer is not enough. Because, 
repudiation refers to a denial of participation in the communication.  
4.2.5.2 Malicious code attacks 
Various malicious codes such as virus, worm, spywares and Trojan horse attack 
both operating systems and user applications that cause the computer system and 
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network to slow down or even damaged. An attacker can produce this type of 
attacks in WLAN and can seek their desire information [41]. 
4.2.6 Multilayer attacks  
In the following, the main multilyer attack types that emerge in the mobile ad hoc 
networks are discussed. 
4.2.6.1 Denial of service (DoS) attacks 
Denial of service attacks [45; 46], aim at the complete disruption of the routing 
function and therefore the whole operation of the ad-hoc network.In the practice, 
the attackers exactly use the radio jamming and battery exhaustion methods to 
conduct DoS attacks to the mobile ad hoc networks, which well correspond to the 
two vulnerabilities. 
The denial of service attack has many forms. Distributed denial of service attack is 
a more severe threat: if the attackers have enough computing power and 
bandwidth to operate with, smaller ad hoc networks can be crashed or congested 
rather easily.  
There are however more serious threats to ad hoc networks. Compromised nodes 
may be able to reconfigure the routing protocol or any part of it so that they send 
routing information very frequently, thus causing congestion or very rarely, thus 
preventing nodes to gain new information about the changed topology of the 
network. In the worst case the adversary is able to change routing protocol to 
operate arbitrarily. If the compromised nodes and the changes to the routing 
protocol are not detected, the consequences are severe, as from the viewpoint of 
the nodes the network may seem to operate normally.  
4.2.6.2 Impersonation 
The impersonation attack [47] is a severe threat to the security of mobile ad hoc 
network. These attacks, also called the spoofing attacks, are attacks where 
malicious node assumes the identity of another node in the networks. By 
45 
 
impersonating another node, attackers are able to receive routing messages that 
are directed to the nodes they faked.  
As we can see, if there is not such a proper authentication mechanism among the 
nodes, the adversary can capture some nodes in the network and make them look 
like benign nodes. In this way, the compromised nodes can join the network as the 
normal nodes and begin to conduct the malicious behaviors such as propagate 
fake routing information and gain inappropriate priority to access some confidential 
information. 
4.3 Security Services 
The ultimate goals of the security solutions [25; 40; 45; 48] for ad hoc networks is 
to provide security services, such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, nonrepudiation, anonymity and availability to mobile users. There is 
no single mechanism that will provide all the security services in ad hoc networks. 
4.3.1 Availability 
Availability means that a node should maintain its ability to provide all services 
regardless of the security state of it. Services are available whenever required.  
4.3.2 Confidentiality 
Confidential information is need to keep secret from all entities, so they don’t have 
the privilege to access them. Disclosure of information should only be accessible 
to the authorized individuals. Confidentiality protects data or a field in message.  
4.3.3 Integrity 
Integrity guarantees that a message being transmitted is never corrupted or 
altered. A message could be corrupted, because of being failures, or because of 
malicious attacks on the network. 
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4.3.4 Authentication 
Authentication ensures that the access and supply of data is done only by the 
authorized parties. Authorization is generally used to assign different access rights 
to different level of users. For instance, we need to ensure that network 
management function is only accessible by the network administrator. Without 
authentication malicious nodes get access on the network and data can be modify 
without any prior notice to authorized nodes. 
4.3.5 Nonrepudiation 
It is the assurance that in a network communication both parties cannot later deny 
their participation. It should be verifiable for a secure network that the sender and 
the receiver in a transmission are really the parties who conducted to do the 
transmission. This is useful especially when we need to discriminate if a node with 
some abnormal behavior is compromised or not: if a node recognizes that the 
message it has received is erroneous, it can then use the incorrect message as an 
evidence to notify other nodes that the node sending out the improper message 
should have been compromised. 
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5 MOBILE AD HOC COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
In this section, mobile ad hoc system based on IEEE 802.11b standard is 
introduced. Firstly, manet_station (Wireless LAN Workstation) mobile nodes are 
used in the network and the results focuse on the whole network performance. For 
each network scenario, five jamming nodes, five misbehaving nodes and 
Byzantine nodes are placed in the network. The results are compared in the same 
graph with and without security attacks.  
 
Figure 5.1 The normal network model 
Subsequently, wlan_wkstn (Wireless LAN Workstation) mobile nodes are used, 
they have different attributes than manet_station nodes, so the network traffic 
loads, i.e., http, ftp, email, voice and video conferencing can be enabled on the 
wlan_wkstn mobile nodes which are placed in the network. Thus, the performance 
metrics can be examined in the figures for different network applications in the 
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addition to the whole network performance using different routing protocols. The 
security attacks are examined in the same figures and the results are compared.  
For each network model, the campus network scenario 800x800 (m) is created, 30 
mobile ad nodes are deployed on OPNET Modeler 14.5 simulator. IEEE 802.11b 
network standard is used for mobile ad hoc nodes. The simulation run time is set 
at 300 sec. for each network simulation. Application configuration, profile 
configuration, and mobility configuration settings are configured to run the network 
as expected. Figure 5.1 represents the normal network model. 
5.1 Simulation Tool 
The simulation is performed in analyzing the effects of Pulse Jammer attack, 
Misbehavior Node attack and Byzantine attack on the network performance under 
different traffic loads. Simulation parameters used are depicted in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Simulation parameter 
Simulation Parameter Value 
Simulator OPNET 14.5 
Area 800x800 (m) 
Number of Nodes 30 Nodes 
Operation Mode 802.11b 
Data Rate of Each Node 11 Mbps 
Routing Protocols DSR, AODV, OLSR, GRP 
Mobility Model Random Waypoint 
Traffic Type HTTP, FTP, Email, Voice, Video Conferencing, Database 
Simulation Time 300 sec. 
Packet Reception Power Threshold -95 dBm 
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5.2 Performance Metrics 
The performance of the whole network under different routing protocols is 
analyzed by four metrics: throughput, network load, delay, data dropped, jitter and 
traffic received. 
5.2.1 Throughput (bits/sec) 
The average rate at which the data packet is delivered successfully from one node 
to another over a communication network is known as throughput. 
5.2.2 Network load (bits/sec) 
Network load is the total packet sent and received across the whole network at a 
particular time. 
5.2.3 Delay (sec) 
The delay is the average time of the packet passing through inside the network. 
5.2.4 Data dropped (bits/sec) 
Data dropped shows that how many packets are successfully sent and received 
across the whole network. 
5.2.5 Traffic received (bytes/sec) 
Average number of bytes per second forwarded to all applications by the transport 
layers in the network. 
5.3 Network Attacks Used in the Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
In this section, the security attacks such as Pulse Jammer attack, Misbehavior 
Node attack and Byzantine attack are explained. These attacks are implemented 
to the normal networks and the results are compared under different traffic loads in 
terms of performance metrics that is mentioned in Section 5.2. 
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5.3.1 Pulse Jammer attack 
Jammer attack [3; 4; 38; 39; 40] generates noise on the wireless radio frequency 
medium to stop the communication in order to trigger the network. The most trivial 
way of disrupting a wireless network is by generating a continuous high power 
noise across the entire bandwidth near the transmitting and/or receiving nodes. 
Jammer frequency device of the targeted networks transmits radio signals with 
generating a continuous high radio frequency (RF) which is powerful signal that 
overwhelmed within the range of network transmission. Subsequently, jamming 
nodes causes corruption of the packets or they causes packet lost. The device 
that generates such a noise is called a jammer and the process is called jamming. 
5.3.2 Byzantine attack 
Byzantine attack [40] can be launched by a single malicious node or a group of 
nodes that work in cooperation. A compromised intermediate node works alone or 
set of compromised intermediate nodes works in collusion to form attacks. The 
compromised nodes may create routing loops, forwarding packets in a long route 
instead of optimal one, even may drop packets. This attack reduces the routing 
performance and also disrupts the routing services. Byzantine attacks are hard to 
detect. 
5.3.3 Misbehavior Nodes attack 
The purpose of misbehaving nodes [43; 49; 50; 51] is not to function properly in 
the network and they achieve their goal by acting maliciously. They stop 
forwarding packets to the other nodes by simply start dropping the packets, or 
consume the bandwidth of the network by broadcasting route when it is not 
necessary. Dropping the packets occurs for many reasons. Misbehaving nodes 
might want to reserve the battery power of their own. They use a lot of bandwidth 
and they don’t collaborate with the other nodes in the network. The misbehavior 
nodes stop performing the basic task; as a result, the network becomes congested 
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and the traffic on the network leads to delay of data and degrade the 
performances of the network. 
5.4 Application Configuration Setting 
Application configuration describe the types of traffic in the simulation model. The 
applications that is used in the network which contains manet_station nodes are 
FTP, E-Mail (medium load) and low Database traffic analyzing. For the network 
which contains wlan_wkstn nodes, the applications are FTP, Email (High Load), 
HTTP (Heavy Browsing), Voice (PCM Quality Speech), Video Conferencing (Low 
Resolution Video). Figure 5.2 represents the attributes of the application 
configuration setting 
 
Figure 5.2 Application configuration setting 
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5.5 Profile Configuration Setting 
The attributes, i.e., implementation period, number of repetition and duration of 
time, etc. of the traffic types defined in the applications are determined during the 
simulation. Profile configuration also specific the operation mode as serial 
(Ordered), serial (Random) and simultaneous. Figure 5.3 represents the attributes 
of the profile configuration setting.  
 
Figure 5.3 Profile configuration setting 
 5.6 Mobility Configuration Setting 
The mobile ad hoc nodes move around in random directions with mobility 
configuration, thus the links between nodes can break and the new links establish 
by discovering new routing tables. Figure 5.4 represents the attributes of the 
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mobility configuration setting. Speed is set as “uniform_int (0,10)”, pause time is 
set as “constant (50)”, start time is set as “constant (10)” and stop time is left as 
default “end of simulation”. 
 
Figure 5.4 Mobile configuration setting 
5.7 Traffic Model Setting for Wireless Stations 
IEEE 802.11b standard is used for mobile ad hoc nodes with data rate 11Mbps. 
The packet interarrival time is set as “exponential (.03)” for all the nodes unless 
otherwise specified. The packet size distribution is exponential with a mean of 
2000 bits. The maximum packet size transmitted in a 802.11b network is 2304 
bytes and packets over this size are discarded at the source. All the wireless 
station nodes use “Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum” at the physical layer. The 
wireless attributes of a station node are represented in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5 Traffic model and wireless attributes of a station node 
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5.8 Intelligent Pulse Jammer Node Model 
Pulse jammer node has different structure than MANET node, it has radio 
transmitter that continuously generate the noise on wireless medium. Jammer 
bandwidth specifies the bandwidth (in kHz) of the transmitting channel. Jammer 
band base frequency specifies the base frequency (in MHz) of the transmitting 
channel.  Jammer transmitter power specifies the transmission power (in Watts) 
allocated to packets transmitted through the channel. Finally, the jammer has a 
pulse width which specifies the length of time (in seconds) a pulse is transmitted 
and a silence width specifies the interval (in seconds) between pulses [3]. In 
Figure 5.6, the jammer node model attributes are represented.  
Figure 5.6 Intelligent Pulse Jammer node model attributes 
5.9 Misbehavior Node Model 
Misbehaving nodes act different on the network, by applying the different packet 
setting. As shown in Figure 5.7, the packet size and packet inter-arrival time are 
changed for misbehaving nodes. 
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Figure 5.7 Misbehavior node model attributes for the networks with manet_station 
and wlan_wkstn mobile nodes 
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5.10 Byzantine Node Model 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Byzantine node model attributes for AODV and DSR 
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Byzantine nodes attributes are changed for dropping routing packets. AODV, 
DSR, GRP and OLSR parameters are changed for making the nodes malicious as 
shown in Figure 5.8 and 5.9.  
 
 
Figure 5.9 Byzantine node model attributes for GRP and OLSR 
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6 SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The simulation is done to analyze the effects of Pulse Jammer attack, Misbehavior 
Node attack and Byzantine attack on the network performance under different 
traffic loads. In this thesis, analysis of performances and capacities of mobile ad 
hoc networks is based on the OPNET simulation tool [52] which provides a good 
model of the IEEE 802.11b standard. The normal network is compared with the 
networks which contain jamming nodes, misbehaving nodes and  Byzantine nodes 
in terms of performance metrics, i.e., delay, network load, throughput, data 
dropped, jitter and traffic received by using different routing protocols. 
6.1 Performance of DSR under Pulse Jammer Attack, under Misbehavior 
Node Attack and under Byzantine Attack for the Network 
In this section, the performance of DSR protocol was compared under jamming 
nodes, misbehaving nodes and Byzantine nodes. Application configuration, profile 
configuration and mobility configuration were defined. Firstly, a normal network 
traffic was generated under DSR protocol, later the scenario was duplicated with 
Pulse Jammer attack, with Misbehavior Node attack, and with Byzantine attack 
respectively. Intruder nodes were placed in the network which contains 30 nodes 
in different locations. DSR protocol was studied in IEEE 802.11b networks and the 
simulation run time was set as 300 seconds. 
6.1.1 Data dropped statistics of DSR protocol for the network 
Different network attack scenarios are designed separately to examine the DSR 
protocol under five Byzantine nodes, five misbehaving nodes and five jamming 
nodes. The results are compared in terms of “data dropped” parameter.  
Figure 6.1 represents the “data dropped” statistics on the normal network traffic 
with the average value of 3,842,385 bits/sec. It shows the “data dropped” with 
Byzantine nodes in the network as 4,501,331 bits/sec, with misbehaving nodes as 
4,384,450 bits/sec and with jamming nodes in the network as 3,894,932 bits/sec 
with respect to the DSR protocol. 
60 
 
The “data dropped” increases in the presence of the network attacks on the 
network when it is compared to the normal network. Jamming nodes deny the 
network transmission services to authorized users by generating noise on the 
wireless medium in order to block the access for authorized nodes. Misbehaving 
nodes consume a lot of bandwidth and do not collaborate with the other nodes in 
the network. Byzantine nodes drop the packets in the network which degrades the 
network routing services. 
 
Figure 6.1 Data dropped results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for DSR protocol 
6.1.2 Delay statistics of DSR protocol for the network 
In this section, five jamming nodes, five misbehaving nodes and five Byzantine 
nodes are placed separately in the normal network with different scenarios. The 
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“delay” statistics are represented for the whole network in the same graph in 
Figure 6.2. 
As seen in Figure 6.2, the delay of the network nodes with normal traffic is noted 
as 9.285 seconds, whereas the delay with jamming nodes is noted as 13.936 
seconds, both for a simulation of 300 seconds duration. The delay of the network 
with misbehaving nodes is recorded as 12.295 seconds and with Byzantine nodes 
as 11.496 seconds. 
 
Figure 6.2 Delay results of the normal network with and without network attacks for 
DSR protocol 
Security attacks on DSR shows a significant result. It is clearly seen in the network 
result that the delay of the whole network with intruder nodes increases when it is 
compared to the normal network. The largest increment of the network “delay” 
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statistic is represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least 
increment is indicated for the network with Byzantine nodes with respect to the 
DSR protocol. 
6.1.3 Network load statistics of DSR protocol for the network 
To implement the network attacks on mobile ad hoc nodes network, five jamming 
nodes, five misbehaving nodes and five Byzantine nodes are deployed separately 
in the network for DSR with different scenarios.   
 
Figure 6.3 Network load results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for DSR protocol 
The network scenarios for different attacks are represented in Figure 6.3. The 
“network load” of the normal network  has the average value of 854,878 bits/sec 
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and with the jamming nodes in the network it is noted as 576,976 bits/sec. For the 
network with misbehaving nodes, its average value is 782,385 bits/sec and the 
“network load” statistics according to the network with Byzantine nodes is recorded 
as 808,432 bits/sec. 
The largest reduction of the “network load” statistic is represented for the network 
with jamming nodes and the least reduction is represented for the network with 
Byzantine nodes with respect to the DSR protocol. The jamming node attack on 
DSR shows a significant result. The pulse jammer attack use the wireless medium 
and decrease the network load. It can be seen that the “network load” slightly 
reduce when the malicious nodes start generating raw packet on the network.  
6.1.4 Throughput statistics of DSR protocol for the network 
In this section, five jamming nodes, five misbehaving nodes and five Byzantine 
nodes are placed separately in the normal network with different scenarios. The 
“throughput” statistics are represented for the whole network in the same graph in 
Figure 6.4. 
The “throughput” of the network nodes with normal traffic is noted as 876,445 
bits/sec and later with jamming nodes in the network it is noted as 594,755 
bits/sec at the time of simulation 300 seconds. As seen in Figure 6.4, the 
“throughput” of the network with misbehaving nodes is recorded as 816,574 
bits/sec and with Byzantine nodes it is noted as 862,088 bits/sec.  
The largest reduction of the network “throughput” statistic is represented for the 
network with jamming nodes and the least reduction is indicated for the network 
with misbehaving nodes with respect to the DSR protocol. This shows the packet 
sent to its destination or forwarding the packets to the other nodes is successfully 
executed before deploying malicious nodes in the network. They reduce the 
performance of the network by all means. 
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Figure 6.4 Throughput results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for DSR protocol 
6.2 Performance of AODV under Pulse Jammer Attack, under Misbehavior 
Node Attack and under Byzantine Attack for the Network 
In this section, Pulse Jammer attack, Misbehavior Node attack and Byzantine 
attack were implemented on AODV routing protocol. 30 mobile ad hoc nodes were 
used for the network without attackers; until then, for each network attack 
scenario, five malicious nodes were placed at different positions in the normal 
network. Thus, when the traffic was generated among the nodes, attackers started 
dropping the packets and stopped forwarding the packets to the other nodes. All 
results were captured and they were compared against the normal network in 
terms of data dropped, delay, network load and throughput. 
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6.2.1 Data dropped statistics of AODV routing protocol for the network 
The “data dropped” statistics of each security attack scenarios are shown for the 
whole network in the same graph.  
Figure 6.5 shows the normal network “data dropped” statistic’s average value as 
914,061 bits/sec, with jamming nodes its average value is recorded as 1,007,433 
bits/sec, with misbehaving nodes the “data dropped” statistic is represented as 
1,149,641 bits/sec and with Byzantine nodes its value is recorded as 1,304,230 
bits/sec. 
 
Figure 6.5 Data dropped results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for AODV routing protocol 
By analyzing the results, the largest increment of the “data dropped” statistic is 
represented for the network with Byzantine nodes and the least increment is 
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represented for the network with jamming nodes with respect to the AODV routing 
protocol. That means, AODV routing protocol is more vulnerable to the network 
with Byzantine nodes for “data dropped” statistics. 
6.2.2 Delay statistics of AODV routing protocol for the network 
The “delay” results of the normal network and the networks with intruder nodes are 
compared in Figure 6.6 for AODV routing protocol.  
 
Figure 6.6 Delay results of the normal network with and without network attacks for 
AODV routing protocol 
As seen in Figure 6.6, the “delay” performance of the network nodes with normal 
traffic is 7.007 seconds and with jamming nodes in the network it is represented as 
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10.943 seconds. The delay of the network with misbehaving nodes is noted as 
9.252 seconds and with Byzantine nodes it is recorded as 8.825 seconds.  
When the normal network  results are compared with the networks including 
malicious nodes, it seems that AODV routing protocol is more vulnerable to the 
network with jamming nodes. On the other hand, it is least affected from the 
network with Byzantine nodes for “delay” statistics. 
6.2.3 Network load statistics of AODV routing protocol for the network 
 
Figure 6.7 Network load results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for AODV routing protocol 
The network scenarios for different attacks are depicted in Figure 6.7. The 
“network load” of the normal network has the average value of 1,037,157 bits/sec 
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and with the jamming nodes in the network it is noted as 692,594 bits/sec. For the 
network with misbehaving nodes, its average value is 914,203 bits/sec and the 
“network load” statistic according to the network with Byzantine nodes is recorded 
as 970,141 bits/sec. The largest reduction of the “network load” statistic is 
represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least reduction is 
represented for the network with Byzantine nodes with respect to AODV routing 
protocol. 
According to Figure 6.7, AODV routing protocol is more vulnerable to the network 
with jamming nodes. Jamming nodes deny service by generating noise and 
causes protocol packets lost. Jamming nodes block the access for authorized 
users. As a result, the network traffic effected badly when malicious nodes are 
placed in the normal network and they start dropping the forwarding packets to the 
other nodes on the network. 
6.2.4 Throughput statistics of AODV routing protocol for the network 
The “throughput” results of AODV normal network and AODV with intruder nodes 
are shown in Figure 6.8. It shows that the network throughput reduces by placing 
the attackers. 
Figure 6.8 shows the normal network “throughput” statistic’s average value as 
4,900,837 bits/sec, with jamming nodes its average value is recorded as 
3,414,509 bits/sec, with misbehaving nodes the “throughput” statistic is 
represented as 4,275,057 bits/sec and with Byzantine nodes its value is recorded 
as 4,461,919 bits/sec. 
When the graph is analyzed, it is clearly seen that the largest reduction of the 
“throughput” statistic is represented for the network with jamming nodes and the 
least reduction is represented for the network with Byzantine nodes with respect to 
the AODV routing protocol. That means, AODV routing protocol is more vulnerable 
to the network with jamming nodes. Due to the abnormal activities of the jamming 
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nodes on the network,  the network becomes more vulnerable and it influences the 
need of reliability, availability and the performance of the network. 
 
Figure 6.8 Throughput results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for AODV routing protocol 
6.3 Performance of OLSR under Pulse Jammer Attack, under Misbehavior 
Node Attack and under Byzantine Attack for the Network 
In this section, the performance of OLSR protocol was compared under jamming 
nodes, misbehaving nodes and Byzantine nodes. As previously described, 
application configuration, profile configuration and mobility configuration were 
defined. The MANET nodes were configured to use OLSR protocol in OPNET. 
Then, for the first, a normal traffic was generated using OLSR protocol, later the 
scenario was duplicated with different security attacks. For each network attack 
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scenario, five malicious nodes were placed in the normal network respectively. 
After simulating both the normal network and the network with malicious nodes, 
the results of each network scenario were compared in terms of data dropped, 
delay, network load and throughput results. 
6.3.1 Data dropped statistics of OLSR protocol for the network 
 
Figure 6.9 Data dropped results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for OLSR protocol 
The “data dropped” statistics are shown for the whole network in the same graph 
with respect to the OLSR protocol with different network attacks. 
Figure 6.9 shows the normal network “data dropped” statistic’s average value as 
871,638 bits/sec. For the network with jamming nodes, the average data dropped 
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value is recorded as 1,413,018 bits/sec; with Byzantine nodes its value is 
1,355,869 bits/sec and with misbehaving nodes the “data dropped” statistic is 
1,113,137 bits/sec. It is seen that the largest increment of the “data dropped” 
statistic is represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least 
increment is represented for the network with misbehaving nodes with respect to 
the OLSR protocol. 
6.3.2 Delay statistics of OLSR protocol for the network 
 
Figure 6.10 Delay results of the normal network with and without network attacks 
for OLSR protocol 
The OLSR protocol is observed by implementing the network attacks on the 
network.  
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Figure 6.10 represents that the normal network traffic “delay” average value is 
3.565 seconds. On the other hand, the network with jamming nodes shows the 
“delay” with the average value of 6.451 seconds, with misbehaving nodes the 
value is recorded as 6.188 seconds and with Byzantine nodes  it is noted as 4.672 
seconds with respect to the OLSR protocol. The largest increment of the network 
“delay” statistic is represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least 
increment is indicated for the network with Byzantine nodes with respect to the 
OLSR protocol. That means, OLSR protocol is more vulnerable to the network with 
jamming nodes for “delay” statistics.  
6.3.3 Network load statistics of OLSR protocol for the network 
 
Figure 6.11 Network load results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for OLSR protocol 
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Figure 6.11 shows that the OLSR protocol with network attacks has a significant 
impact on network load. The normal network load statistic is recorded as 
1,803,619 bits/sec. Then, it is noted as 1,115,144 bits/sec with jamming nodes in 
the network. The network load statistic average value is 1,462,642 bits/sec with 
misbehaving nodes and with Byzantine nodes in the network its value is noted as 
1,719,109 bits/sec for OLSR protocol. 
It is clearly showed that the decrease in network load affects the reliability of the 
network. The largest reduction of the “network load” statistic is represented for the 
network with jamming nodes and the least reduction is represented for the network 
with Byzantine nodes with respect to the OLSR protocol. 
6.3.4 Throughput statistics of OLSR protocol for the network 
The normal network throughput is compared with Pulse Jammer attack, with 
Misbehavior Node attack and with Byzantine attack for OLSR protocol in Figure 
6.12. As we notice the differences of security attacks, they cause network 
congestion and decrease the network performance. 
The “throughput” results on the normal network traffic with and without intruder 
nodes are analyzed. The normal network’s throughput is recorded as 2,127,076 
bits/sec. Then, it is noted as 1,333,900 bits/sec with jamming nodes in the 
network. The “throughput” statistic’s average value is 1,860,430 bits/sec with 
misbehaving nodes and with Byzantine nodes in the network its value is noted as 
2,112,589 bits/sec with respect to the OLSR. 
The throughput decreases in the presence of the intruder nodes in the network 
when it is compared to the normal network. The largest reduction of the 
“throughput” statistic is represented for the network with jamming nodes and the 
least reduction is represented for the network with Byzantine nodes for OLSR 
protocol. As the throughput shows that the jamming nodes start dropping the 
packets when the simulation start working. If the jamming nodes start to act 
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maliciously and prevent forwarding the packets on time to the other nodes, the 
network performance degrades. 
 
Figure 6.12 Throughput results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for OLSR protocol 
6.4 Performance of GRP under Pulse Jammer Attack, under Misbehavior 
Node Attack and under Byzantine Attack for the Network 
In this section, GRP was used as the routing protocol. GRP network was 
generated with 30 mobile ad hoc nodes. The normal network traffic results were 
collected, then five jamming nodes, five misbehaving nodes and five Byzantine 
nodes were placed in the network respectively and the captured results were 
compared in respect of data dropped, delay, network load and throughput. 
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6.4.1 Data dropped statistics of GRP for the network 
“Data dropped” results of the whole network is shown in Figure 6.12. When the 
normal network and the networks with attacker nodes are compared, it can be 
observed that the intruder nodes decrease the network performance. As the 
packets sent from the mobile ad hoc nodes to the other nodes on the network, 
they lost due to the attackers. This clearly reflects the availability and reliability of 
mobile ad hoc nodes in terms of network security. 
 
Figure 6.13 Data dropped results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for GRP 
Analysis on Figure 6.13, it shows that the data dropped of the normal network’s  
average value is 821,149 bits/sec. On the other hand, the network with 
misbehaving nodes shows the network data dropped with the average value of 
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2,173,947 bits/sec, with Byzantine nodes the value is noted as 1,624,040 bits/sec 
and with  jamming nodes  it is recorded as 1,326,377 bits/sec with respect to the 
GRP. The largest increment of the “data dropped” statistic is represented for the 
network with misbehaving nodes and the least increment is represented for the 
network with jamming nodes according to the GRP.  
6.4.2 Delay statistics of GRP for the network 
 
Figure 6.14 Delay results of the normal network with and without network attacks 
for GRP 
In Figure 6.14, the “delay” statistic of the entire network with and without intruder 
nodes is analyzed. By observing the graph, it can be seen that there is a 
difference between normal network and the networks with malicious nodes. The 
delay increases, when the network attacks implemented to normal network. It 
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starts increasing at the beginning of the simulation and continues to increase until 
the end of of the simulation. 
Figure 6.14 represents the “delay” statistics on the normal network traffic with the 
average value of 2.681 seconds. It shows the delay with misbehaving nodes in the 
network as 5.004 seconds, with Byzantine nodes as 4.054 seconds and with 
jamming nodes in the network as 3.934 seconds with respect to the GRP. 
According to the graph, GRP is more vulnerable to the network with misbehaving 
nodes for the “delay” statistics. Misbehaving nodes act as maliciously, for that 
reason some intermediates nodes in the network follows the selected nodes to 
forwarding the packets and the delay of packet transmission increases. 
6.4.3 Network load statistics of GRP for the network 
In Figure 6.15, different network scenarios for the metioned network attacks are 
represented with respect to the GRP. 
The average value of the normal “network load” is 2,162,370 bits/sec. Moreover, 
the network with jamming nodes shows the network load with the average value of 
1,611,132 bits/sec, with misbehaving nodes the value is recorded as 1,876,978 
bits/sec and with Byzantine nodes  it is noted as 2,031,115 bits/sec according to 
the GRP. 
It represents the network load decreased by placing the intruder nodes on the 
network, they prevent the mobile ad hoc nodes to continue the transmission on the 
network and the packets lost because of the network attacks.  
The largest reduction of the “network load” statistic is represented for the network 
with jamming nodes and the least increment is represented for the network with 
Byzantine nodes according to the GRP. MANETs deal with a lot of network attacks 
and each security attack has its own specification to damage or to destroy the 
mobile ad hoc node infrastructure. 
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Figure 6.15 Network load results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for GRP 
6.4.4 Throughput statistics of GRP for the network 
The throughput of the security attacks reduces the traffic on the network when it is 
compared to the normal network traffic as shown shown in Figure 6.16. There is a 
significant traffic destruction of the packets transmission on the network when 
employing the network attacks. Figure 6.16 represents the “throughput” statistics 
on the normal network traffic with the average value of 2,208,482 bits/sec. It 
shows the throughput with jamming nodes in the network as 1,650,695 bits/sec, 
with misbehaving nodes as 2,003,187 bits/sec and with Byzantine nodes in the 
network as 2,176,862 bits/sec according to the GRP. The largest reduction of the 
“throughput” statistic is represented for the network with jamming nodes and the 
least increment is represented for the network with Byzantine nodes for GRP. 
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Figure 6.16 Throughput results of the normal network with and without network 
attacks for GRP 
6.5 Performance of Routing Protocols under Pulse Jammer Attack, under 
Misbehavior Node Attack and under Byzantine Attack for Voice 
Application in respect of Packet End-to-End Delay Statistics 
In this section, intelligent pulse jammer attack, misbehavior node attack and 
Byzantine attack were created and implemented on DSR, AODV, OLSR, GRP 
protocols and all these routing protocols were implemented on each single 
network scenario. Firstly, application configuration, profile configuration and 
mobility configuration were defined and a normal network traffic was generated 
with 30 nodes, later five intruder nodes for each single network scenario were 
implemented to the network and the results were compared for voice application in 
respect of “packet end-to-end delay“ statistics.  
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6.5.1 Packet end-to-end delay statistics of DSR protocol for voice 
application 
 
Figure 6.17 Packet end-to-end delay results of the normal network’s voice 
application with and without network attacks for DSR protocol 
The graph provides details of the results and evaluation of the normal network’s 
voice application with and without network attacks for DSR protocol. Figure 6.17 
represents the “packet end-to-end delay” statistics for voice application on the 
normal network traffic with the average value of 7.667 seconds. It shows the 
“packet end-to-end delay” with jamming nodes in the network as 10.864 seconds, 
with misbehaving nodes as 9.748 seconds and with Byzantine nodes in the 
network as 9.235 seconds with respect to the DSR. 
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The delay of the network’s voice application increases in the presence of the 
network attacks when it is compared to the normal network’s voice traffic. Secure 
communication involves the secure transmission on the wireless medium and the 
communication mechanisms among nodes. Each security attack has its own 
specification to damage or to destroy the mobile ad hoc nodes infrastructure. 
6.5.2 Packet end-to-end delay statistics of AODV routing protocol for voice 
application 
 
Figure 6.18 Packet end-to-end delay results of the normal network’s voice 
application with and without network attacks for AODV routing protocol 
Figure 6.18 shows the jamming nodes, misbehaving nodes and Byzantine nodes 
activities on the network for voice application in respect of “packet end-to-end 
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delay” parameters using the AODV protocol. The delay increases systematically to 
higher levels by placing of the intruder nodes in the network. 
The packet end-to-end delay for voice application has the average value of 7.372 
seconds and with the jamming nodes in the network it is noted as 10.556 seconds. 
For the network with misbehaving nodes, its average value is 8.945 seconds and 
the “packet end-to-end delay” statistics according to the network with Byzantine 
nodes is recorded as 8.731 seconds.  
The largest reduction of the “packet end-to-end delay” statistic for voice traffic is 
represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least reduction is 
represented for the network with Byzantine nodes with respect to AODV routing 
protocol. 
By observation the graph, it can be clearly seen that the packet end-to-end delay 
of the networks with intruder nodes for voice traffic starts almost at the same time 
together with the delay of the normal nerwork’s voice traffic. It shows that the 
increase in delay affects the reliability and the avaliability of the network and takes 
the network in to the congestion. 
6.5.3 Packet end-to-end delay statistics of OLSR protocol for voice 
application 
The Figure 6.19 shows the “packet end-to-end delay” statistics of OLSR protocol 
for voice application on the networks with and without jamming nodes, 
misbehaving nodes and Byzantine nodes in the network.  
As seen in Figure 6.19, the delay of the network’s voice application with normal 
network traffic is recorded as 5.134 seconds, whereas the voice traffic’s delay with 
jamming nodes is noted as 8.250 seconds, both for the simulation of 300 seconds 
duration. The delay of the network’s voice application with Byzantine nodes is 
recorded as 5.904 seconds and with misbehaving nodes as 5.446 seconds. 
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The packet end-to-end delay increases when it is compared with the normal 
network’s voice traffic. The reason for the increase in delay is that the intruder 
nodes act as maliciously, they don’t cooperate with the other nodes on the network 
and the data packets aren’t transmited from the source node to the destination 
node on time. The intruder nodes forward the packets only when they want too.  
 
Figure 6.19 Packet end-to-end delay results of the normal network’s voice 
application with and without network attacks for OLSR protocol 
The up and down voice delay of OLSR protocol under the network with and 
without network attacks is unbalanced. The possible reason for this up and down 
rate of the voice traffic delay could be that the network nodes start to exchange the 
routing discovery, route request and routing table among each other in respect of 
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the OLSR protocol. When the malicious nodes are placed in the network, the voice 
traffic delay is recorded higher than the normal network’s voice traffic delay. 
6.5.4 Packet end-to-end delay statistics of GRP for voice application 
The packet end-to-end delay of the network’s voice application with normal nodes 
and with intruder nodes is simulated and the results are captured in Figure 20. The 
results show that there is significant changes on the delay of the network’s voice 
traffic with implementation of the security attacks to the network. 
 
Figure 6.20 Packet end-to-end delay results of the normal network’s voice 
application with and without network attacks for GRP 
In Figure 6.20, the “packet end-to-end delay” statistics are analyzed for voice 
application on the normal network traffic with and without malicious nodes. The 
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normal network’s “packet end-to-end delay” statistic is recorded as 5.506 seconds. 
Then, it is noted as 7.004 seconds with jamming nodes in the network. The delay 
statistics average value is 6.107 seconds with Byzantine nodes and with 
misbehaving nodes in the network its value is noted as 5.785 seconds with respect 
to the GRP. 
According to the graph, GRP is more vulnerable to the network with jamming 
nodes. Pulse jammer attack transmit noise in wireless medium. Therefore the 
jamming nodes cause DoS attack with in the wireless channel. Jamming nodes 
transmit on a single frequency marked by a periodic pulse train in time.  
The graph also represents that  the packet delay time for voice application 
increases in the presence of the network attacks on the network. This indicates 
that, with malicious nodes in the normal network, the network performance 
degrades for voice traffic of the network. 
6.6 Performance of Routing Protocols under Pulse Jammer Attack, under    
Misbehavior Node Attack and under Byzantine Attack for Voice 
Application in respect of Jitter Statistics 
In this section, Pulse Jammer attack, Misbehavior Node attack and Byzantine 
attack were examined on DSR, AODV, OLSR, GRP routing protocols respectively. 
Some changes were applied in intruder nodes to act maliciously by dropping the 
data packets and by causing a delay in the transmission of the packets, while the 
data packets were being tried to send from the source node to the destination 
node on the network. Firstly, for each single scenario, the normal network traffic 
was generated with 30 mobile ad hoc nodes and later on five jamming nodes, five 
misbehaving nodes and five Byzantine nodes were placed in the network 
respectively. Then, the results were compared for voice application in respect of 
“jitter” statistics. 
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6.6.1 Jitter statistics of DSR protocol for voice application 
Figure 2, represents the “jitter” statistics for voice application in the same graph. 
Jitter [19] is the ratio of transmission delay of the current packet and the 
transmission delay of the previous packet.  
Figure 6.21 represents the “jitter” statistics for voice application on the normal 
network traffic with the average value of 0.006 seconds. It shows the jitter with 
jamming nodes in the network as 0.012 seconds, with Byzantine nodes as 0.009 
seconds and with misbehaving nodes in the network as 0.007 seconds with 
respect to the DSR protocol. 
 
Figure 6.21 Jitter results of the normal network’s voice application with and without 
network attacks for DSR protocol 
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Analysis on the graph, it is seen that the largest increment of the “jitter” statistic for 
voice traffic is represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least 
increment is represented for the network with misbehaving nodes in respect of 
DSR protocol. That means, the DSR protocol is more vulnerable to the network 
with jamming nodes for jitter results of the normal network’s voice application. The 
graph shows that the security attacks have a significant impact on the network’s 
voice traffic for “jitter” statistic according to the DSR protocol. The network attacks 
reduce the reliability and performance of the network. 
6.6.2 Jitter statistics of AODV routing protocol for voice application 
 
Figure 6.22 Jitter results of the normal network’s voice application with and without 
network attacks for AODV routing protocol 
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“Jitter” statistics are represented for voice application in the same graph. In the 
graph above, it is clearly seen that jitter increases in the beginning of the 
simulation up to a certain point and from that point onwards it degrades rapidly. 
This is due to the fact that the utilization of the network reaches a steady state 
after some time. 
Figure 6.22 shows that the average value of the normal network traffic jitter in 
voice applications is 0.0043 seconds. On the other hand, the network with 
jamming nodes shows the jitter with the average value of 0.0057 seconds; with 
Byzantine nodes the value it is noted as 0.0044 seconds and with misbehaving 
nodes it is recorded as 0.004 seconds with respect to the AODV routing protocol.  
The results show significant changes in “jitter” statistic for voice application, 
especially for the network with jamming nodes and with Byzantine nodes.  Due to 
malicious activities of the jamming nodes and Byzantine nodes, the jitter increment 
is more than the normal network for AODV routing protocol. Also for the network 
with misbehaving nodes, the jitter increment is more than the normal network in 
general. However, it reduces at some certain points. The reason of this reduction 
could be that misbehaving nodes start dropping the packets and do not forward 
the packets to the other nodes on the network, then the misbehaving nodes start 
sending the packets and forwarding packets faster than the normal nodes. As a 
result, normal nodes are not able to process the packets. 
6.6.3 Jitter statistics of OLSR protocol for voice application 
The network scenarios for different attacks are depicted in Figure 6.23. The  “jitter”  
parameter of the normal network’s voice application has the average value of 
0.118 seconds and with the Byzantine nodes in the network it is noted as 0.183 
seconds. For the network with misbehaving nodes, its average value is 0.167 
seconds and the “jitter” statistics according to the network with jamming nodes is 
recorded as 0.133 seconds. The largest increment of the jitter statistic for voice 
application is represented for the network with Byzantine nodes and the least 
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reduction is represented for the network with jamming nodes with respect to OLSR 
protocol. 
 
Figure 6.23 Jitter results of the normal network’s voice application with and without 
network attacks for OLSR protocol 
By examine the results, it is observed that the OLSR protocol is more vulnerable to 
the Byzantine nodes for “jitter” statistics of the network’s voice application. The 
Byzantine attack shows that it drops the routing table for the other nodes and 
behaves malicious on purpose. The Byzantine nodes create routing loops and 
drop the data packets. The voice traffic delay of OLSR protocol under the network 
with and without security attacks notice up and down and it is unbalanced. The 
reason for this up and down rate of the voice traffic jitter could be that the network 
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nodes start to exchange the routing discovery, route request and routing table 
among each other in respect of the OLSR protocol. 
6.6.4 Jitter statistics of GRP for voice application 
The jitter results of the normal network’s voice traffic with and without network 
attacks are compared in Figure 6.24 for GRP.  
 
Figure 6.24 Jitter results of the normal network’s voice application with and without 
network attacks for GRP 
Jitter statistic of the network’s voice application with normal traffic is recorded as 
0.0004 seconds and the jitter parameter with misbehaving nodes is noted as 
0.0368 seconds. On the other hand, the jitter of the network’s voice traffic with 
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Byzantine nodes is noted as 0.0292 seconds and with jamming nodes as 0.0222 
seconds. 
The largest increment of the “jitter” statistic for voice application is represented for 
the network with misbehaving nodes and the least increment is represented for the 
network with jamming nodes with respect to GRP. This shows that the most 
malicious nodes in the network are misbehaving nodes. They don’t perform their 
duties, they lose the data packets and don’t forward the required data packets to 
the other nodes in the network. 
The up and down voice delay of GRP under the network with and without network 
attacks is unbalanced and the reason for this has been mentioned pervious 
section. 
6.7 Performance of Routing Protocols under Pulse Jammer Attack, under 
Misbehavior Node Attack and under Byzantine Attack for Email 
Application in respect of Traffic Received Statistics 
In this section, the performance of routing protocols was compared under Pulse 
Jammer attack, under Misbehaviour Node attack and under Byzantine attack. First 
of all, a normal network traffic was generated using DSR, AODV, OLSR and GRP 
routing protocols respectively, then each network scenario was duplicated with 
different security attacks which were mentioned before. Five jamming nodes, five 
misbehaving nodes and five Byzantine nodes were placed in the network 
respectively. Four scenarios were occured in OPNET simulator by using 30 ad hoc 
nodes with IEEE 802.11b standard for email application in respect of “traffic 
received” statistics.  
6.7.1 Traffic received statistics of DSR protocol for email application  
The traffic received of the network’s email application is shown in Figure 6.25. 
When the normal network’s email application and the email application of the 
networks with intruder nodes are compared, it is seen that the “traffic received” 
statistics decreases with security attacks on the network. 
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Figure 6.25 represents that the average value of the normal network’s email traffic 
received is 180.53 bytes/sec. On the other hand, the average value of the 
network’s traffic received for email applicaiton with jamming nodes is 13.33 
bytes/sec, with Byzantine nodes the value is recorded as 66.93 bytes/sec and with 
misbehaving nodes it is noted as 126.93 bytes/sec with respect to the DSR 
protocol.  
 
Figure 6.25 Traffic received results of the normal network’s email application with 
and without network attacks for DSR protocol 
The largest reduction of the traffic received statistic for email application is 
represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least reduction is 
represented for the network with misbehaving nodes with respect to DSR protocol. 
The vulnerable activities of the malicious nodes decrease the traffic received 
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gradually and the traffic received of the network’s email application reduces more 
if the simulation time is extended more than 300 seconds. 
6.7.2 Traffic received statistics of AODV routing protocol for email 
application  
 
Figure 6.26 Traffic received results of the normal network’s email application with 
and without network attacks for AODV routing protocol 
In Figure 6.26, the traffic received is represented for the normal network’s email 
application with and without network attacks in respect of the AODV routing 
protocol. 
In the graph below, it is seen that the traffic received for email application 
increases in the beginning of the simulation up to a certain point and from that 
point it degrades rapidly. This is due to the fact that the utilization of the network 
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reaches a steady state after some time. And because of the abnormal activities of 
the intruder nodes, the traffic received reduction is more than the normal network’s 
email traffic received for AODV routing protocol. 
The “traffic received” statistic of the normal network’s email application is recorded 
as 140.8 bytes/sec. Then, it is noted as 107.25 bytes/sec with jamming nodes in 
the network. The average value of the “traffic received” statistics for email traffic is 
113.65 bytes/sec with Byzantine nodes and with misbehaving nodes in the 
network its value is noted as 127.15 bytes/sec with respect to the AODV routing 
protocol.  
The largest reduction of the traffic received statistic for email application is 
represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least reduction is 
represented for the network with misbehaving nodes with respect to AODV routing 
protocol. 
6.7.3 Traffic received statistics of OLSR protocol for email application 
In this section, the performance of OLSR protocol under jamming nodes, 
misbehaving nodes and Byzantine nodes are compared. For each network attack 
scenario, five malicious nodes are placed in the normal network. 
In Figure 6.27, the “traffic received” statistics for email application on the normal 
network traffic with and without malicious nodes are analyzed. The normal 
network’s traffic received statistics is recorded as 153.9 bytes/sec. Then, it is 
noted as 140.5 bytes/sec with jamming nodes in the network. The “traffic received” 
statistics average value is 127.1 bytes/sec with misbehaving nodes and with 
Byzantine nodes in the network its value is noted as 100.32 bytes/sec with respect 
to the OLSR protocol. 
When placing the malicious nodes in the network, the MANET traffic received is 
recorded lower than the normal network traffic. There is significant traffic 
destruction of the packets transmission on the network when applying network 
attacks. 
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Figure 6.27 Traffic received results of the normal network’s email application with 
and without network attacks for OLSR protocol 
6.7.4 Traffic received statistics of GRP for email application 
The normal GRP network’s email traffic received is lower than the GRP network’s 
email traffic received under pulse jammer attack and the captured results are 
shown in Figure 6.28.  
There is a difference between the network’s email traffic with and without 
malicious nodes in the network. Intruder nodes clearly reflects the availability and 
reliability of mobile ad hoc nodes in terms of security. The largest reduction of the 
traffic received statistic for email application is represented for the network with 
jamming nodes and the least reduction is represented for the network with 
misbehaving nodes with respect to GRP. 
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Figure 6.28 Traffic received results of the normal network’s email application with 
and without network attacks for GRP 
Traffic received of the network’s email application is analyzed with and without 
intruder nodes. The normal email traffic received is recorded as 194.027 bytes/sec 
and later with jamming nodes in the network, the email traffic received is noted as 
40.107 bytes/sec. For the network with Byzantine nodes, its average value is 
60.373 bytes/sec and the “traffic received” statistics according to the network with 
misbehaving nodes is recorded as 120.587 bytes/sec.  
6.8 Performance of Routing Protocols under Pulse Jammer Attack, under 
Misbehavior Node Attack and under Byzantine Attack for Video 
Conferencing Application in respect of Traffic Received Statistics 
In this section, the networks using DSR, AODV, OLSR and GRP routing protocols 
were generated with 30 mobile ad hoc nodes respectively. Application 
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configuration, profile configuration and mobility configuration were defined. The 
mobile ad hoc nodes were configured to use mentioned routing protocols in 
OPNET. The normal network traffic results were collected, then five jamming 
nodes, five misbehaving nodes and five Byzantine nodes were placed in the 
network respectively and the captured results were compared for video 
conferencing application in respect of “traffic received” statistics.  
6.8.1 Traffic received statistics of DSR protocol for video conferencing 
application  
Figure 6.29 shows the email traffic received with and without security attacks in 
the network.  
By examine the graph, it is observed that the rate of traffic received with intruder 
nodes on the network is decreased steadily. The largest reduction of the traffic 
received statistic for video conferencing application is represented for the network 
with jamming nodes and the least reduction is represented for the network with 
Byzantine nodes with respect to DSR protocol. 
The “traffic received” statistics for video conferencing application of the normal 
network is recorded as 2,131 bytes/sec with respect to the DSR protocol. Ad hoc 
nodes exchange the routing table to the other nodes and few packets are dropped 
or discarded. After implementing the jamming nodes, it decreases to 979.5 
bytes/sec. Jamming nodes deny the network transmission services. The graph 
represents the “traffic received” statistics of video conferencing application as 
1,440 bytes/sec for the network with misbehaving nodes. Because of the 
misbehaving nodes don’t forward the data packets to other nodes, they drop the 
data packets and  the entire network lead to congestion in terms of network 
performance. Figure 6.29 shows that the traffic received of the video conferencing 
application with Byzantine nodes in the network is noted as 1,901 bytes/sec in 
respect of the DSR. The Byzantine nodes don’t perform their basic tasks for the 
fulfilment of the network’s requirements in good means and these activities 
decrease the performance of the network. 
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Figure 6.29 Traffic received results of the normal network’s video conferencing 
with and without network attacks for DSR protocol 
6.8.2 Traffic received statistics of AODV routing protocol for video 
conferencing application  
Figure 6.30 represents that the average value of the normal network traffic 
received in video conferencing application is noted as 6,451 bytes/sec. Introducing 
the jamming nodes affectively reduce the traffic received of the network video 
conferencing at the rate of 979.2 bytes/sec. This result shows a poor performance 
of the video conferencing traffic. The misbehaving nodes decreases the video 
conferencing traffic received by causing corruption of the packets and keep 
dropping the packets randomly. The performance of the jamming nodes have a 
significant affect on the network’s video conferencing traffic received. On the other 
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hand, the network with misbehaving nodes shows the average value of the video 
conferencing traffic received with 3,628 bytes/sec; with Byzantine nodes the value 
is noted as 4,320 bytes/sec in respect of the AODV routing protocol.  
 
Figure 6.30 Traffic received results of the normal network’s video conferencing 
with and without network attacks for AODV routing protocol 
The reliability of the network reduces in terms of the network security. The largest 
reduction of the traffic received statistic for video conferencing application is 
represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least reduction is 
represented for the network with Byzantine nodes in respect of the AODV routing 
protocol. 
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6.8.3 Traffic received statistics of OLSR protocol for video conferencing 
application 
 
Figure 6.31 Traffic received results of the normal network’s video conferencing 
with and without network attacks for OLSR protocol 
The “traffic received” parameters for video conferencing application are 
represented  in Figure 6.32 for the networks with and without network attacks with 
respect to the OLSR protocol. 
In Figure 6.32, the normal network’s video conferencing traffic received statistics is 
noted as 7,718 bytes/sec. Then, it is recorded as 3,052 bytes/sec with jamming 
nodes in the network. The average value of the video conferening traffic received 
statistics is recorded as 4,780 bytes/sec with misbehaving nodes and with 
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Byzantine nodes in the network its value is noted as 5,932 bytes/sec according to 
the OLSR protocol.The largest reduction of the traffic received statistic for video 
conferencing application is represented for the network with jamming nodes and 
the least reduction is represented for the network with Byzantine nodes in respect 
of the OLSR protocol. 
The captured results show that the intruder nodes failed the network performance 
in every aspect. OLSR video conferencing traffic received decreases when the 
intruder nodes damage the network by their malicious activities. 
6.8.4 Traffic received statistics of GRP for video conferencing application 
 
Figure 6.32 Traffic received results of the normal network’s video conferencing 
with and without network attacks for GRP 
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To implement the network attacks on MANET nodes network, five jamming nodes, 
five misbehaving nodes and five Byzantine nodes are deployed separately in the 
network for GRP with different scenarios.   
The “traffic received” statistics for video conferencing application of the normal 
network is noted as 3,859 bytes/sec at the duration time of simulation 300 seconds 
in Figure 6.32. After implementing the five jamming nodes, it decreases to 345.6 
bytes/sec. The reason for this is because jamming nodes generate a noise on 
radio frequency in pulse time which decreases the “traffic received” statistics on 
the network for GRP. The graph represents the traffic received statistics of video 
conferencing application as 1,640 bytes/sec for the network with misbehaving 
nodes. Due to the misbehaving nodes, the network becomes congested. Figure 
6.32 shows the traffic received with Byzantine nodes in the network as 2,707 
bytes/sec with respect to the GRP. The Byzantine attack has a negative impact on 
the transmission and network traffic. 
The largest reduction of the traffic received statistic for video conferencing 
application is represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least 
reduction is represented for the network with Byzantine nodes according to the 
GRP. 
6.9 Simulation Results 
In this thesis, the performance of routing protocols has been compared under 
jamming nodes, misbehaving nodes and Byzantine nodes. The impact of Pulse 
Jammer Attack, Misbehavior Node Attack and Byzantine Attack has been 
investigated on DSR, AODV, OLSR and GRP routing protocols. 
Fistly, the performances of Reactive Routing Protocols such as DSR and AODV 
routing protocols has been compared under jamming nodes, under misbehaving 
nodes and under Byzantine nodes for the whole network. By analyzing the results, 
the largest reduction is represented for the network with jamming nodes and the 
least reduction is represented for the network with Byzantine nodes according to 
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the network load and throughput statistics and for the delay statistics the largest 
increment is represented for the network with jamming nodes and the least 
increment is represented for the network with Byzantine nodes in respect of DSR 
and AODV routing protocols. According to the results, it seems that DSR and 
AODV routing protocols are more vulnerable to the network with jamming nodes 
and placing the malicious nodes in the network reduces the performance of the 
network. In addition, Reactive Routing Protocols, i.e., DSR and AODV routing 
protocols behave in a similar manner.  
The performance of OLSR protocol has been investigated under Pulse Jammer 
attack, Misbehavior Node Attack and Byzantine Attack and the results are 
compared in terms of performance metrics, i.e., data droped, delay, network load 
and throughput. By observing the results, it can be said that OLSR protocol is 
more vulnerable to Pulse Jammer attack and less vulnerable to Byzantine attack in 
general. It is clearly seen in the network results that the malicious nodes drop the 
data packets and don’t forward the data packets to the other nodes and the 
network performance is affected badly. 
The performance of GRP has been examined under security attacks that is 
mentioned before. The network traffic results are compared with and without 
jamming nodes, misbehaving nodes and Byzantine nodes in the network. 
Performance metrics, i.e.,  data droped, delay, network load and throughput are 
observed for analyzing the captured results. According to the results, GRP is 
acting a little different from the others, the largest reduction is represented for the 
network with jamming nodes and the least reduction is represented for the network 
with Byzantine nodes according to the network load and throughput statistics. 
However, for the delay and data dropped statistics, the largest increment is 
represented for the network with misbehaving nodes and the least increment is 
represented for the network with jamming nodes in respect of GRP. These kind of 
malicious activities spoil the transmission and  the network traffic suffer badly. 
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The performances of for DSR, AODV, OLSR and GRP routing protocols have 
been compared under Pulse Jammer attack, under Misbehavior Node attack and 
under Byzantine attack for voice application in respect of packet end-to-end delay 
statistics. The network traffic results are compared with and without intruder nodes 
in the network. It is clearly seen in the network results that the packet end-to-end 
delay statistics with intruder nodes increases when it is compared to the normal 
network. Reactive Routing Protocols, i.e., DSR and AODV routing protocols 
behave in a similar manner. These routing protcols usually are more vulnerable to 
the network with jamming nodes and less vulnerable to the Byzantine nodes for 
voice application in packet end-to-end delay statistics. Nevertheless, GRP and 
Proactive Routing Protocol, i.e., OLSR Protocol are more influenced against Pulse 
Jammer attack, but less affected against Byzantine attacks for voice application in 
respect of packet end-to-end delay statistics. The network attacks drope the 
packets in the network and degrade the network routing services. 
The performances of DSR, AODV, OLSR and GRP routing protocols have been 
compared under Pulse Jammer attack, under Misbehavior Node attack and under 
Byzantine attack for voice application with respect to jitter statistics. Analysis on 
the results, it is seen that DSR and AODV routing protocols give a similar 
response against the network attacks. They are more affected against jamming 
nodes, whereas GRP and OLSR routing protocols are less influenced against 
jamming nodes for jitter statistics of the network’s voice application. Jitter statistics 
with intruder nodes increases when it is compared to the normal network.  The 
jitter of the network with intruder nodes notice up due to the malicious activities on 
the network. 
The performances of DSR, AODV, OLSR and GRP routing protocols have been 
compared under Pulse Jammer attack, under Misbehavior Node attack and under 
Byzantine attack for email application according to traffic received statistics. By 
observation the results, it can be said that DSR, AODV and GRP routing protocols 
give similar results. These protocols are more affected against the Pulse Jammer 
attack and they are less affected against the Misbehavior Node attack for traffic 
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received statistics of the network’s email application. However,  Proactive Routing 
Protocol, i.e., OLSR Protocol is less influenced against the Pulse Jammer attack 
for email application according to the traffic received statistics. The traffic received 
decreases systematically to lower level by placing the intruder nodes in the 
network.  
The performances of DSR, AODV, OLSR and GRP routing protocols have been 
compared under Pulse Jammer attack, under Misbehavior Node attack and under 
Byzantine attack for video conferencing application in respect of traffic received 
statistics. It is seen in the network results that four routing protocols which are 
mentioned before give a similar response against the security attacks. They are 
more vulnerable to the network with jamming nodes and less vulnerable to the 
Byzantine nodes for video conferencing application in respect of traffic received 
statistics. The traffic received results decreases by placing the intruder nodes in 
the network for video conferencing traffic load. The decrease in traffic received 
affects the reliability and availability of the network. 
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7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this research, Position-based Routing Protocol (GRP), Proactive Routing 
Protocol (OLSR), and Reactive Routing Protocols (AODV and DSR) are studied in 
IEEE 802.11b networks. The network performance under Pulse Jammer attack, 
under Misbehavior Node attack and under Byzantine attack is investigated.  
The network with manet_station mobile nodes contains ftp, email (medium load) 
and low database traffic analyzing and the network with wlan_wkstn nodes 
contains http (heavy browsing), ftp (high load), email (high load), voice (PCM 
Quality Speech) and video conferencing (low resolution video) applications. The 
normal networks are compared with the networks which include jamming nodes, 
misbehaving nodes and Byzantine nodes in terms of performance metrics, i.e., 
delay, network load, throughput, data dropped, jitter and traffic received by using 
different routing protocols. In addition, the performance of the routing protocols are 
compared under Pulse Jammer attack, under Misbehavior Node attack, and under 
Byzantine attack. 
Results show that routing protocols are more vulnerable to the networks with 
jamming nodes, and placing the intruder nodes in the network reduces the 
reliability, availability and the performance of the network. In addition, when the   
performance of the routing protocols are compared under Pulse Jammer attack, 
under Misbehavior Node attack, and under Byzantine attack, based on the 
research and analysis of the simulation results, DSR has the worst performance 
compared with the other three routing protocols AODV, GRP and OLSR. 
Jammer attack generates noise on the wireless radio frequency medium to stop 
the communication in order to trigger the network. A controlling transmitter can 
generate signal that will be strong to overcome the target signal and can disrupt 
communications.  Subsequently, messages are lost due to the high noise in the 
spectrum. Misbehavior Node attack stops forwarding packets to the other nodes 
and drop the packets, it stop performing the basic task and the network 
performance degrades. Misbehaving nodes affects the network in several different 
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security aspects. Also, Byzantine attack drops, modifies and mis-route the 
forwarding packets in an attempt to disrupt the routing service.  
Several security breaches are represented under these three attack models using 
OPNET. They provide useful insight in understanding MANET in terms of the 
network security.  
Future work encompasses extending results to other security attacks and wireless 
protocols, and adding detection and defense mechanisms that can protect the 
network from the intruders. 
Security is a primary concern in mobile ad hoc networks. The use of computer 
networks becomes a necessity for government, industry, and personal businesses. 
As communication technology networks continue to grow, potential vulnerabilities 
are under greater threat. Everyday, attackers are trying to find a new security 
vulnerability in mobile ad hoc networks. A single weak point may give the attacker 
the opportunity to gain the access of the system and perform malicious tasks, so 
security must be provided for the entire system.  
 
Research in this field continues for many years, but still in an early stage. There 
are many unanticipated attacks remaining undiscovered. Cyber attacks, including 
hacking, of business websites and computer systems are increasingly common. 
These attacks can be extremely damaging for businesses, computer information 
systems, computer networks or personal computer devices. So, protection and 
defense against cyber attacks become inadequate as attackers become more 
sophisticated. The ability to track and trace attackers is crucial. As cyber attacks 
change, new defenses need to be developed. Additionally, more research needs 
to be done on data security in different levels, secure routing protocols, efficient 
key agreement and distribution, and trust management for large mobile ad hoc 
networks. Today's security architecture must be agile, flexible, and deeply 
integrated. It must offer a far-reaching view of threats to prevent attacks and avert 
their worst effects. 
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